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SWORDS IN THE HANDS OF BABES:
RETHINKING CUSTODY INTERVIEWS AFTER TROXEL
CYNTHIA STARNES*
INTRODUCTION
And the king said, Bring me a sword. And they brought a swordbefore the king.
And the king said, Divide the living child in two, and give half to
the one, and half to the other.
Then spake the woman whose the living child was unto the king,
for her bowels yearned upon her son, and she said, 0 my
lord, give her the living child, and in no wise slay it. But
the other said, Let it be neither mine nor thine, but divide
it.
Then the king answered and said, Give her the living child, and
in no wise slay it: she is the mother thereof.'
King Solomon had it easy. Parents with poor custodial potential do
not often reveal themselves by agreeing to cut their children in half. Nor
do parents fighting for custody 3 often demonstrate a selfless willingness to
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University, DCL College of Law. Thanks
to Craig Callen and Brian Kalt for their insightful criticisms of an earlier version of this
Article, to Susan Bitensky, Mae Kuykendall, Frank Ravitch, Glen Staszewski and R.
George Wright for their helpful comments and encouragement, to Judge Joan Young and
Amye Warren for their expertise, and to Jane Edwards and Hildur Hanna for their excellent
research support.
1. Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 974 n. 13 (Md. 1986) (quoting 1 Kings 3:24-
27).
2. One commentator has suggested that the King may actually have been
"outguessed by the woman who declared she would rather give up the child than have it cut
in two." Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1987).
3. Throughout this Article, "custody" refers to primary physical custody;
"custodian" and "custodial parent" refer to the parent who has primary physical custody;
and "noncustodial parent" refers to the parent who does not have primary physical custody,
but who usually has visitation rights. The custodian/noncustodian terminology reflects a
conventional custody model. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 cmt. e (2000) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
Even less binary models, such as the shared parenting and joint custody models urged by
social workers, continue in practice the traditional maternal custodian/parental visitation
model. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Disclosure, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 731-34 (1998). For a
discussion of the ALI's recently proposed custody model, see infra notes 251-66 and
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sacrifice their own interests in order to protect their children. More
commonly, parents appear equally fit4 and equally willing to sacrifice the
child's immediate well-being, thrusting her into the crossfire of custodial
war' in the hope of winning the right to possess her.6
Into this perilous setting steps the State, commissioned to save the
child from her would-be protectors. The State's goal is twofold: (1)
protect the child's ultimate welfare by basing custody on the child's best
interests;7 and (2) shield the child from unnecessary trauma during the
custody battle.' Neither goal is easily accomplished. Hoping to inject
accompanying text.
4. See id. at 2-3 ("[Tlhere usually is no rational basis for preferring one parent
over another.").
5. Numerous commentators have analogized custody disputes to warfare. See,
e.g., JONATHAN W. GOULD, CONDUCTING SCIENTIFICALLY CRAFTED CHILD CUSTODY
EVALUATIONS 145 (1998) ("A majority of divorced fathers viewed the divorce as a 'battle'
in which there was a winner and a loser. The clearly identified enemy was the former
wife."); Richard Wolman & Keith Taylor, Psychological Effects of Custody Disputes on
Children, 9 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 399, 407 (1991) ("The adversarial viewpoint presumes a
zero-sum game mentality according to which one parent 'wins' and one parent 'loses' and
the child loses one parent in the process.").
6. Fortunately, most custody cases are settled without litigation. In a study by
Maccoby and Mnookin, only four percent of 933 families with minor children required a
custody hearing. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 137-38 (1992). In some of these settled cases,
however, one parent may have extracted economic concessions from the other by wielding a
Solomonic sword, knowing that "a parent truly interested in the welfare of a child will give
up almost anything to protect the child, and thus the threat of enforced joint custody can be
used to extract unwarranted concessions." Taylor, 508 A.2d at 974; see also Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981) ("[T]he primary caretaker parent ... will be
willing to sacrifice everything else in order to avoid the terrible prospect of losing the child
in the unpredictable process of litigation.").
7. Typically, best-interests custody statutes advise courts to consider a series of
vague, self-evident factors, such as the parent-child relationship and the mental and physical
health of everyone involved. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A
U.L.A. 282 (1998):
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of
the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does
not affect his relationship to the child.
8. This potential for trauma is significant. As one commentator observed, "[a]ny
judge or trial lawyer, any forensic psychiatrist or other mental-health specialist will affirm
that child custody is, indeed, the ugliest of all litigations." MELVIN G. GOLDZBAND,
CONSULTING IN CHILD CUSTODY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE UGLIEST LITIGATION FOR
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determinacy into the open-ended best-interests custody standard, legal
actors have begun increasingly to rely on the child's custodial preference
as a proxy for her best interests. 9 In an effort to ascertain this preference
without subjecting the child to the trauma of courtroom testimony, most
states authorize courts to interview children in camera. 0 Good intentions
notwithstanding, these custody interviews pose considerable risk to
children, to their parents, and to the State's best-interests quest. These
risks take three forms: (1) process risks (a child's increased entanglement
in custody conflict); (2) information risks (a custody decision based on a
child's inaccurate statements and unreasonable preferences); and (3)
outcome risks (a child's burdensome sense of responsibility for the custody
choice).
These risks increase dramatically when in-camera interviews serve as
tools for searching out preferences that have not been publicly volunteered;
when children's preferences are given very weighty or dispositive effect;
and when the state denies parents an opportunity to challenge the accuracy
and reasonableness of their children's statements."
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville2 increases
the urgency of a reassessment of these custody practices. Troxel's
reaffirmation of the significance and breadth of parental rights13 strengthens
parents' claim that procedural due process entitles them to access their
children's in-camera statements. While such parental access reduces
information risks, it greatly increases already-high process risks for
MENTAL-HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, at ix (1982). Judges are not immune from the stress this
ugliness fosters. As one Michigan judge observed, a judge assigned only custody cases,
will "either have a nervous breakdown or else he won't do a good job." Frederica K.
Lombard, Judicial Interviewing of Children in Custody Cases: An Empirical and Analytical
Study, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807, 812 n.31 (1984).
9. For a brief review of preference statutes, see infra notes 31-33 and
accompanying text. For a brief summary of the best-interests critique, see infra Part III.
10. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.14 cmt. a. While the Latin derivation
of "in camera" suggests a definition limited to "in chambers," the term is often used in a
broader sense. As one court explained:
The meaning of the word "chambers" varies with the context in which it
is used. It may mean a room adjacent to a courtroom in which a judge performs
the duties of his office when his court is not in session. The word "chambers"
is also commonly used in a different sense. When a judge performs a judicial
act while the court is not in session in the matter acted upon, it is said that he
acted "in chambers" whether the act was performed in the "judge's chambers,"
the library, at his home, or elsewhere.
People v. Valenzuela, 66 Cal. Rptr. 825, 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (citing Von Schmidt v.
Widber, 34 P. 109 (Cal. 1893); In re Lux's Estate, 35 P. 341 (Cal. 1893)).
11. States disagree as to whether and under what conditions parents should have
access to a record of the interview. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.14 reporter's
notes cmt. a; see also infra Part II.B.3.a.
12. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
13. See id. at 65-66.
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children, and counsels careful attention to the context and consequence of
preference interviews.
Abdicating the custody decision to a child is an unacceptable response
to the inadequacies of the best-interests standard. If this standard creates a
decision-making vacuum, as critics have charged, 4 it should either be
abandoned or it should be refined, as the American Law Institute (ALl) has
recently proposed. The ALl model offers a compelling alternative to the
nebulous best-interests standard by apportioning custodial responsibility
according to pre-divorce caretaking. 5 If modified to make the child's
preference dispositive only in extraordinary cases, this model would better
enable judges to determine custody, lessening their temptation to unwisely
abandon the decision to a child.
Indeed, Solomon's wisdom lay partly in the fact that he did not hand
the sword to the child. 6 Had the King been persuaded by contemporary
notions of custody wisdom, the classic parable might be quite different:
And the king said, Bring me a sword. And they brought a sword
before the king.
And the king said, Deliver the sword into the child's hands so
that she may pierce the heart of the parent she loves least.
Then spake the child, for her bowels yearned for both her
parents, "0 my lord, do not ask me to kill either one or the
other, for I love them both the same."
Part I of this Article briefly surveys preference practices, considers
their costs and benefits, and urges a retreat from preference-driven
interviews and preference-determinative custody decisions. Part II
considers parental demands for access to children's in-camera statements,
and concludes that although such parental access increases risks for
children, procedural due process favors it. Part III suggests that the law's
increasing willingness to delegate the custody decision to children stems
partly from failure of the open-ended best-interests custody model, and
advocates substitution of a modified version of the ALI's more determinant
approximation standard. This modified ALl model would allow a
reformulation of in-camera interviews as opportunities for children to
engage in free narrative, more fully empowering their speech while freeing
them from the burdens of painful choice.
14. Numerous commentators have attacked the best-interests standard for its
indeterminacy, a concern briefly explored infra Part III.
15. See infra Part III.
16. For this perspective, I am indebted to my colleague, Frank Ravitch, Professor
of Law, Michigan State University, DCL College of Law.
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I. TELL US WHO You LOVE MOST
"Whom do you like better, your mother or your father?"
"I like them the same."
"Well, don't you maybe like one of them the teeniest bit better
than the other?"
"No, I like them both the same. Exactly the same."
"What would happen if you did like one of your parents better
than the other?"
"But I don't."
"But let's just say you did."
"But I don't."
"Well, what would happen to some other kid whose parents were
divorced and he liked one of his parents better than the
other?"
"The parent he didn't like best wouldn't like him."
"What would they do?"
"They wouldn't love him anymore. 17
A. Preference-Based Decision-Making
Asking children to choose their custodian has not long been the
custody practice. Under ancient Roman law, fathers had an absolute right
to custody of their children, whom the law viewed as their father's
property. ' English law adopted this rule of paternal right, as did some
early nineteenth-century U.S. courts.' 9 Early on, however, U.S. courts
endorsed a best-interests-of-the-child custody model,2" an indeterminate
standard that generally aims to identify the parent more likely to further the
child's well-being. 2' The difficulty of applying this vague standard to the
17. ANTHONY E. WOLF, WHY DID You HAVE To GET A DIVORCE? 93 (1998).
18. The rule of absolute paternal preference dates at least from the days of ancient
Rome, when a father had a right to sell or even to kill his children. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET
AL., FAMILY LAW 613 (3d ed. 1998). Under Roman law, the father's will was dispositive.
"[N]o amount of cruelty, neglect of duty or immorality on his part, affected in the slightest
degree his claim to the custody of his children." Id. at 614 (quoting FORSYTH, CUSTODY OF
INFANTS 8 (1850)). Paternal entitlement survived even death, enabling a father to choose
another male to serve as custodian in his stead, notwithstanding the objection of the child's
mother. Kathleen Nemechek, Note, Child Preference in Custody Decisions: Where We
Have Been, Where We Are Now, Where We Should Go, 83 IOWA L. REV. 437, 440 (1998).
19. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 614. For a much-cited example of this
paternal preference, see The King v. De Manneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054, 1054-55 (K.B.
1804) (awarding custody to father notwithstanding mother's claim of spousal cruelty).
20. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 614.
21. For a brief summary of the many critiques of the best-interests standard, see
infra note 247. While not precisely a definition, the ALI states that the primary objective of
2003:115
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complex task of choosing a child's custodian inspired courts to rely on
numerous heuristics," among them the "tender years" doctrine, an
assumption that nature intends young children to be with their mother."
Notwithstanding its tenuous analytic foundation, the tender years doctrine
dominated custody decision-making through much of the twentieth century.
What thus began as a rule of absolute paternal preference under Roman
law evolved into a rule of absolute maternal preference in U.S. law, at
least in cases of children of "tender" years. Throughout this history of
custody decision-making the child's status remained that of a prized
chattel,24 whose perspectives were far less important than the right to
possess her.
In the 1960s and 1970s, coincident with the women's movement, legal
actors began to reexamine the gendered basis of custody decision-making.2 5
its proposed model, to serve the child's best interests, is facilitated by:
(a) parental planning and agreement about the child's custodial
arrangements and upbringing;
(b) continuity of existing parent-child attachments;
(c) meaningful contact between the child and each parent;
(d) caretaking relationships by adults who love the child, know how to
provide for the child's needs, and place a high priority on doing so;
(e) security from exposure to conflict and violence;
(f) expeditious, predictable decisionmaking and the avoidance of
prolonged uncertainty respecting arrangements for the child's care and
control.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02(1).
22. See JAMES C. BLACK & DONALD J. CANTOR, CHILD CUSTODY, at xi-xii (1989)
(describing the comparable work of child custody investigators and noting that the difficulty
of making arrangements for a child's custody leads some investigators to "make custody
decisions badly" and many others to "fall back on convenient presumptions to avoid making
decisions at all").
23. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 614. In his 1968 treatise, Professor Clark
reported that "the courts have adopted a rule of thumb or presumption that the welfare of a
child of 'tender years' is normally best served by placing him in the custody of his mother."
HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 17.4, at
585 (1968).
This maternal preference, explained one court, "needs no argument to support it
because it arises out of the very nature and instincts of motherhood; nature has ordained it."
Krieger v. Krieger, 81 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Idaho 1938). For an example of the "tender
years" doctrine, see Klein v. Klein, 11 N.W. 367 (Mich. 1882) (finding reversible error in
award of custody of three-year-old boy to father under former Michigan statute giving
mother custody of young children).
24. For a critique of the legal tradition treating children as parental property, see
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1809-12 (1993) (observing that "[tihemes of
individualism, private enterprise, and parental rights of ownership mark our history and
survive in our state laws of custody").
25. See Nemechek, supra note 18, at 440. Critics of maternal preference have
objected to its tendency to reinforce the notion that "taking care of children is a woman's
job." Elster, supra note 2, at 10. But see Fineman, supra note 3, at 768-69 (urging
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In 1970, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), shunning the
gender-biased tender years doctrine,26 included in its new statutory scheme
an intuitively-appealing and gender-neutral best-interests factor: "the
wishes of the child as to his custodian. 27 By 1977, sixteen states made the
child's preference a mandatory consideration;28 by 1998, thirty-eight states
had child preference statutes. 29  Even in states whose statutes do not
expressly mention the child's preference, courts may consider it as a factor
supplementing the non-exhaustive statutory list of relevant factors."
While states generally agree that the child's preference is relevant to
custody, they vary considerably in the weight accorded that preference. A
small number of states leave both the decision to consider preference and
the determination of its appropriate weight wholly to the discretion of
individual judges." Most states require courts to consider the preference
of a sufficiently-mature child, but leave the maturity question and the
weight of the mature child's preference to judicial discretion. 2 A few
recognition of women's continuing role as primary caretaker as a significant factor in
custody decision).
26. The tender years doctrine has been abolished in virtually all states. ELLMAN
ET AL., supra note 18, at 615. Its remnants are not altogether absent from our jurisprudence
however. See, e.g., DeCamp v. Hein, 541 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
("[W]e do not believe the [tender years] doctrine has been totally abolished. For example, a
six-month-old baby being nursed by her mother should obviously be in her mother's
custody, unless the judge found her unfit."); see also Eric G. Andersen, Children, Parents
and Nonparents: Protected Interests and Legal Standards, 1998 BYU L. REV. 935, 943-44
("[D]espite its death and burial as a matter of black-letter law, the maternal preference
persists, at least as an empirical matter.").
27. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402(2), 9A U.L.A. 282. Unfortunately,
the UMDA's use of the word "his" injects the appearance of gender bias into what is clearly
a gender-neutral concept. The UMDA did not originate the practice of considering the
child's preference, which can be traced to the mid-1800s. See Lombard, supra note 8, at
810 (citing, as an example, State v. Smith, 6 Me. 462 (1830)).
28. See David M. Siegel & Suzanne Hurley, The Role of the Child's Preference in
Custody Proceedings, 11 FAM. L.Q. 1, 18-20, 29 (1977). For a historical survey of child
preference custody laws, see Nemechek, supra note 18.
29. Nemechek, supra note 18, at 445.
30. Although the Virginia custody statute, for example, does not expressly list the
child's preference as a factor, ninety percent of Virginia judges in one survey "reported that
the preference of a child aged fourteen and older was either dispositive ... or extremely
important." Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Children's Preference in Adjudicated Custody
Decisions, 22 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1045-46, 1050 (1988).
31. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(VI) (1992 & Supp. 2000); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 113 (West 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10(l)(c) (1998 & Supp.
2002). See generally Nemechek, supra note 18, at 457.
32. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.13(3)(i) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §
1653(3)(C) (West 1998); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(3)(i) (West 2002); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3109.04(B)(1), (B)(2)(b) (Anderson 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(8)
(Michie 2000); see also ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 reporter's notes cmt. f;
Nemechek, supra note 18, at 452-57. Many of these state statutes are patterned after the
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states make preference dispositive when the child has reached a designated
age and the parent is not unfit.33 Even in jurisdictions in which preference
is not dispositive, trial courts who have failed to consider the wishes of
even pre-adolescent children have occasionally been reversed on appeal.34
Since the 1970s, custody law has focused more and more myopically on
the child's wishes.35
Concerned that children, already distraught by the breakup of their
family, not be subjected to the trauma of open testimony and cross-
examination, 36 the UMDA37 and most of the states that consider
preference 3' authorize courts to ascertain the child's preference during an
in-camera interview. Unfortunately, in its infatuation with preference, the
UMDA language, which provides that a court "shall consider" the child's wishes but leaves
the weight of that preference to the discretion of an individual judge. See UNIF. MARRIAGE
& DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282.
33. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 reporter's notes cmt. f; see, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(a)(4) (1999 & Supp. 2002) (age fourteen unless parent unfit); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-11-65(1)(a) (1999 & Supp. 2001) (age twelve if both parents fit); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.008 (Vernon 2002) (age twelve, subject to court's approval); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-4 (Michie 1997) (age fourteen, subject to court's approval). For an
argument that "the stated preference of any child over the age of six years should be legally
dispositive of that child's custody," see Randy Frances Kandel, Just Ask the Kid! Towards
a Rule of Children's Choice in Custody Determinations, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 299, 301
(1994).
34. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 reporter's notes cmt. f (citing
Ellison v. Ellison, 628 So. 2d 855 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (age ten); Hensgens v. Hensgens,
653 So. 2d 48 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (ages eight and ten); Bowers v. Bowers, 475 N.W.2d
394 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (ages six and nine)).
35. See Randi L. Dulaney, Comment, Children Should Be Seen and Heard in
Florida Custody Determinations, 25 NOVA L. REV. 815, 819 (2001); see also Nemechek,
supra note 18, at 459-60.
36. See Burghdoff v. Burghdoff, 239 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976)
("[A] child... who most likely has already undergone the agony inherent in the breakup of
a family unit, should not be subjected to the additional pain of having to testify in open court
and be cross-examined."); Lincoln v. Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d 659, 660 (N.Y. 1969):
It requires no great knowledge of child psychology to recognize that a
child, already suffering from the trauma of a broken home, should not be placed
in the position of having its relationship with either parent further jeopardized
by having to publicly relate its difficulties with them or be required to openly
choose between them.
But see Jethrow v. Jethrow, 571 So. 2d 270, 273 (Miss. 1990) (ruling that parent may call
child as a witness in divorce litigation).
37. Section 404(a) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides:
The court may interview the child in chambers to ascertain the child's wishes as
to his custodian and as to visitation. The court may permit counsel to be present
at the interview. The court shall cause a record of the interview to be made and
to be part of the record in the case.
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 404(a), 9A U.L.A. 380 (1998). For a discussion of the
inclusion of counsel and record requirement, see infra Part II.B.3.a-.b.
38. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.14 reporter's notes cmt. a.
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law has too often assumed that the privacy of the judge's chambers and the
State's good intentions can adequately protect children from any peril
posed by the preference question itself. This assumption requires testing.
B. The Wisdom of Asking
A child is not a rag doll, to be tossed in a corner, her perspectives
ignored while a judge decides which parent should take her home.39 The
issue, however, is not whether children should have a voice when their
custody is at issue, but rather the proper scope and significance of that
voice. Simply put, should the State invite a child to choose her custodian?
The ALI recently warned that " [g]iving great weight to the preference of a
child ... can raise significant difficulties. "40 Although the ALl ultimately
endorses a version of preference-based decision-making," its observation
suggests a need to carefully consider the costs and benefits of the
preference question.
1. POTENTIAL COSTS
Asking children to express a custodial preference poses three risks: (1)
process risks (a child's increased entanglement in custody conflict); (2)
information risks (a custody decision based on inaccurate statements of fact
and unreasonable preferences); and (3) outcome risks (a child's
burdensome sense of responsibility for the custody choice).
a. Process Risks: Trauma to the Child
No matter how respectful or how careful a judge may be, the process
of interviewing a child draws her deeper into the custody conflict. Already
caught up in a whirlwind of anger, uncertainty, and fear,42 the child is
39. As Wallerstein, Lewis, and Blakeslee observed:
Lawyers speak up for what parents want but no one speaks for the child....
[H]er wishes, her preferences, how she feels about the proposed plans, and how
she wishes to spend her time separate from each parent are considerations that
are hardly ever raised. In our current system, a child is treated like a rag doll
that quietly sits wherever it is placed.
JUDITH WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR
LANDMARK STUDY 312 (2000).
40. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f; see also id. § 2.14 cmt. b
("Declining to give a greater role to the child's perspective reflects some caution about
soliciting their preferences-caution based on their immaturity, their unreliability, and the
burdens placed on them when they are asked to choose between parents.").
41. For a discussion of the ALI proposal, see infra Part III.
42. Numerous commentators have described the stress of children whose parents
are divorcing, among them Jonathon Gould:
2003:115
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confronted by a powerful stranger who wants her to talk about a family
breakup she may be struggling to deny.43 While an in-chambers
conversation surely is less stressful for children than testimony on the
witness stand,44 the setting of the conversation cannot fully protect children
from the cost of the conversation itself.45 Asking children to choose
between their parents places a tremendous burden on them. 6
The adults on whom the child has relied for guidance and nurturance
have proved mysteriously unable to answer the critical question of who
should take care of her, and so the fate of the family has fallen into the
child's hands. There is no win-win solution for the child, for each custody
choice presents an undesirable outcome: choose mom and disappoint dad,
Children are deeply affected by the breakup of their family. Their lives are
profoundly altered by the anger, disappointment, and failure that characterize[]
their parents' marital breakdown. The child feels a loss of control over his or
her environment. Suddenly, there is a group of strangers with whom they must
talk, tests to take, and a judge who talks about choosing between mommy and
daddy.
GOULD, supra note 5, at 3; see also Daniel C. Schuman, The Unreliability of Children's
Expressions of Preference in Domestic Relations Litigation: A Psychiatric Approach, 14
MASS. L. REV. 14 (1984) ("[Flamily litigation is one of the great stresses which can impact
a child. "); Judith Wallerstein, The Long-Term Effects of Divorce on Children: A Review, 20
J. AM. ACADEMY CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 349, 350 (1991) (" [D] ivorce is unlike
any other seemingly similar life experience for a child, such as parental loss through death,
in being specifically rooted in failure of the relationship between the man and the woman
who modeled for the child the reliability of love and commitment.").
43. See GOULD, supra note 5, at 3 (observing that children of divorce "want their
parents to stop pretending to be mad at each other and to live together again").
44. A large body of scientific literature portrays the psychological trauma suffered
by children who testify against their abusers in open court. Dorothy Marsil et al., Child
Witness Policy: Law Interfacing with Social Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 213
(2002). Recognizing this potential for trauma in abuse proceedings, the Supreme Court
upheld the practice of transmitting children's testimony through closed-circuit television
against a Confrontation Clause challenge. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990).
45. As one attorney observed:
[Conversation] in the judge's chambers, where it is most often heard, is
traumatic to any child, at almost any age. The mere suggestion that the child
might have to testify against a parent creates a state of apprehension that may
not end until long after the divorce is over.
JAMES T. FRIEDMAN, THE DIVORCE HANDBOOK: YOUR BASIC GUIDE TO DIVORCE 31 (rev.
ed. 1999). Friedman is the former president of the prestigious American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers. Id. at About the Author; see also Joan B. Kelly, Psychological and
Legal Interventions for Parents and Children in Custody and Access Disputes: Current
Research and Practice, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 154 (2002) (observing that "from a
clinical perspective, being interviewed in chambers is a formidable and inherently stressful
experience for most school-aged youngsters").
46. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.14, cmt. b (noting the "burdens placed
on [children] when they are asked to choose between parents"); Schuman, supra note 42, at
14 ("Choosing one parent over another for a child as a pass/fail situation is a huge
burden."). For a discussion of the child's sense of responsibility for the custody outcome,
as opposed to her stress over the custody question, see infra Part I.B. 1.c.
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or choose dad and disappoint mom. The child may thus feel "despair,
depression and guilt" as she experiences "a step in the direction of one
parent ... as a betrayal of the other."47 And she may believe the judge is
encouraging her "to behave in a disloyal manner by stating a preference
for one parent over the other."48 Posing the preference question indirectly
rather than directly may reduce, but will not eliminate the child's stress,
for even the immature child will understand that her conversation with the
judge is related to the custody battle and consequently that her statements,
especially any expressly negative statements about a parent, may
jeopardize a parent's chance for custody. 9
Children who are already experiencing loyalty conflicts may become
further stressed and confused when their parents tell them "opposing
truths. "50 Each parent's attempt to convince the child of her merit and the
other parent's inadequacy creates cognitive dissonance for the child who
struggles to integrate the views of each parent's valued but inconsistent
view. " The significance of the child's decision increases her experience of
dissonance.
47. Id. at 830 (quoting JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING
THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 49, 88 (1980)); see also
Robin Drapkin & Florence Bienefeld, The Power of Including Children in Custody
Mediation, 8 J. DIVORCE 63, 66 (1985) ("Young children of ten fear they will be made to
say bad things about Mommy and Daddy.").
48. Lombard, supra note 8, at 836.
49. In the analogous context of custody mediation, Robert E. Emery observed:
In [some] cases, the children who I interviewed were frozen with fear,
afraid ... of saying anything that could be construed as taking sides with one
parent and against the other. I did not see children who felt "empowered" by
my attempt to give them a voice; I saw children who felt burdened by being
asked, however gently or cleverly, to choose between their parents.
Robert E. Emery, Easing the Pain of Divorce for Children: Children's Voices, Causes of
Conflict and Mediation Comments on Kelly's "Resolving Child Custody Disputes," 10 VA. J.
SO. POL'Y & L. 164, 167 (2002). The ALI suggests, however, that "[t]he risks of involving
children in disputes for which they may feel personally responsible may be diminished by
ascertaining their preferences indirectly." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f.
Children, for example, might be asked "about what they like to do with each parent or how
time is spent when they are together, rather than with whom they want to live." Id. § 2.14
cmt. b. Reliance on indirect questioning not only suffers from an over-optimism about
children's inability to understand the point of these questions, but also exacerbates already-
high communication problems between judge and child, leading a judge to misinterpret a
child's oblique statements and to inaccurately identify a supposed preference. For a
discussion of communication challenges, see infra Part I.B. 1.b.(i).
50. See Schuman, supra note 42, at 15.
51. Cognitive dissonance describes the discomfort associated with contemplation of
two inconsistent sets of facts or choices. See generally LEON FESTINGER, CONFLICT,
DECISION AND DISSONANCE (1964); LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
(1957). As Wolman and Taylor explain:
One of the most pathogenic dynamics of the typical child custody dispute is that
in which the child becomes the object of intensive lobbying by parents who feel
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Under these circumstances, children are not likely to experience their
decision-making authority as empowering,52 but rather as an awful
burden.5 3 Children who are unable or unwilling to answer the preference
question may experience a sense of disempowerment driven by the failure
to accept an invitation of control." On balance, "the very act of
expressing a preference may be contrary to the child's best interest.""
b. Information Risks: Inaccurate Fact-Finding
A private conversation between a judge and child offers much
normative appeal. Caring and careful, intuitive and wise, the judge will
talk with the child on the courthouse steps, over ice cream perhaps,
searching out the child's preference, her perspectives and other information
relevant to custody. Informed by this conversation, the judge will then
make a better custody decision. At least, that's the way the story goes.
Unfortunately, the reality may be very different, as a child, stunned and
bewildered by the disintegration of her family,56 caught up in the trauma of
compelled to convince him or her of their own innocence, their spouse's guilt or
their view of life in general. The child has few defenses against this dynamic.
One who protests, who expresses doubt or skepticism to a parent, may be
berated for betrayal; one who is not so accused may view himself or herself as a
traitor.
Wolman & Taylor, supra note 5, at 407. For a discussion of the effect of cognitive
dissonance in the case of adults, see Elizabeth Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About
Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 62-70 (1990).
52. In the context of child clients, Professor Buss has given the term
"empowerment" a two-part definition:
At its most concrete, empowerment means enabling clients to exercise direct
influence over the litigation process and indirect influence over litigation
outcomes. At a more abstract level, empowerment means enabling clients to
influence the way in which they are perceived by judges, lawyers, other parties,
and as a consequence, themselves.
Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child Clients, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 895, 898 (1999).
53. As Professor Buss observed, "children's emotional and psychological
development renders them uniquely dependent upon their parents, which undermines their
ability to experience the exercise of control over decisions negatively affecting either parent
as a good." Buss, supra note 52, at 944.
54. See id. at 942.
55. Schuman, supra note 42, at 14.
56. As Jonathan Gould explains:
Most children do not expect their parents to divorce, even when they live in
homes in which their parents are continually fighting. They are stunned and
upset when their parents separate. Their whole world has been turned upside
down, their security and safety have been seriously threatened, and they are
afraid of the unknown-the future without two parents. The exception is
children from high-conflict families, who may be relieved that the repeated,
intense conflicts between their parents have mercifully been put to an end. Even
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custody litigation, and intimidated by the judge and her surroundings,
endures an interrogation by a judge who is well-intentioned but unschooled
in child development or interview technique. The judge poses a series of
closed questions,57 "inadvertently misleading the child, distorting her
answers, and subtly suggesting responses consistent with the judge's bias 5 1
in a conversation too swift to allow either the judge or the child to collect
her thoughts.59  The judge then bases custody on misinformation,
mistakenly favoring the "less-worthy" parent and perhaps even imperiling
the child's ultimate well-being. While most cases probably fall somewhere
in between this idyllic vision and worst-case scenario, it would be a
mistake to assume that children's in-camera statements are entirely
trustworthy or that a judge will invariably spot unreliable statements in a
conversation that lasts less than twenty minutes. 60  Both the child's
statement of preference and her statements otherwise relevant to custody
pose serious information risks.
(i) The preference question: I like mom / dad best
Information risks begin with the child who cannot or will not state a
clear preference.61 Indeed, "the proposition that a child, who is going
these children have significant emotional reactions despite their relief that the
fighting has stopped.
GOULD, supra note 5, at 129.
57. A closed question is one that requires a one or two word answer. DAVID L.
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 14-2.3.7, at 184 (2d ed. 2002). A judge, for example, might ask a child,
"does your mother prepare your breakfast?" Closed questioning, "option-posing," and
forced-choice all describe a focused questioning style that contrasts with a more open-ended,
"invitational" style, which promotes free narrative, an uninterrupted account of an event in
one's own words and at one's own pace. Id. § 14-2.3.7, at 183; see also Amye R. Warren
& Dorothy F. Marsil, Why Children's Suggestibility Remains a Serious Concern, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 144-47 (2002) (contrasting "invitational" questions with "option-
posing" questions). "Invitational" questions tend to produce more accurate information
from children than "option-posing" questions. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra, § 14-2.3.7, at
167; see also infra Part I.B. 1.b.(ii).
58. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 57, § 14-2.3.4, at 180 ("[A]n interviewer's
favored hypothesis can influence the accuracy of young children's reports.").
59. See id. § 14-2.3.7, at 13 ("[S]wift questioning does not allow the interviewee
and interviewer time to collect their thoughts, and as a consequence, does not lend itself to
elaborate memory retrieval.").
60. Lombard, supra note 8, at 814-15 (reporting survey of Michigan judges who
estimated they spent a median of 18.5 minutes interviewing children in custody cases); Scott
et al., supra note 30, at 1047 (reporting study of Virginia judges whose in-chambers custody
interviews "typically lasted less than fifteen minutes").
61. As Professor Jones observes, "[a]mong the responses judges may expect from
children in interview situations are blank walls of silence, contradictory statements, the
intentional hiding of thoughts, opinions, and feelings, especially if the child suspects
HeinOnline -- 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 127 2003
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
through one of the most emotional and trying experiences in his or her life,
can briefly and clearly relate a viewpoint on a custodial preference to a
virtual stranger (the judge) may not be realistic." 62 Some children will
simply refuse to choose between their parents, sometimes because their
affection and need for each parent is in equipoise or because they 'deny any
need to choose, hoping against hope that their parents will "stop pretending
to be mad at each other" and "kiss and make up.",63 Other children will in
fact prefer one parent but be reluctant to express that preference for fear of
disappointing the nonpreferred parent. 64 Judges may be hard-pressed in a
brief conversation 65 to distinguish between the child who is reluctant to
express her preference and the child who has no preference.
For the judge who succeeds in searching out the child's preference,
more is required, as the preference must be tested for its consistency, its
voluntariness, and its reasonableness. Little would be gained, for example,
by ascertaining a strongly-held but fluctuating preference, which
"depend[s] upon whether the child is asked [on] Monday or Wednesday. "66
For some children, inconsistency will be more immediate, as stress and
immaturity produce apparently contradictory preferences at the same time
and place.67 If consistency is defined as "steadfastness but flexibility amid
changing circumstances," rather than rigidity, 68 then a child's polarized
position on preference may demonstrate "paralyzing anxiety" rather than
consistency. 69 The truly consistent preference is thus one that "occupies
the broad middle ground between circumstantial ricochet and obstinate
monomania."7 0 Identifying such a preference requires a longitudinal
observation not possible in a single in-camera observation.
Even when preference is consistent, it may not be voluntary, that is, it
may not be the product of the child's free will. At worst, the child will
criticism, reproach, or ridicule, and an attempt to confuse or distort the truth." Cathy J.
Jones, Judicial Questioning of Children in Custody and Visitation Proceedings, 18 FAM.
L.Q. 43, 59 (1984); see also ALL PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f ("[A child's
preference] can be difficult to ascertain, as the child may have conflicted feelings.");
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 57, § 14-2.3 ("[Clhild interviewees are not especially
forthcoming in terms of their event reports .... ").
62. Molloy v. Molloy, 637 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001), aff'd inpart
and vacated in part, 643 N.W.2d 574 (Mich. 2002); see also Buss, supra note 52, at 915
("Children do not have a single, fully formed viewpoint that adults can access simply by
asking the right questions.").
63. GOULD, supra note 5, at 3.
64. See supra Part I.B.1.a.
65. See supra note 60 (noting that judges in Virginia and Michigan estimate that
their interviews with children last between fifteen and 18.5 minutes, respectively).
66. Id. at 829.
67. See Schuman, supra note 42, at 14.
68. See id. at 17.
69. Id. at 18.
70. Id.
128
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base preference on a "fear of reprisal" by a parent who has directly
threatened her with physical or emotional punishment.7 More often,
parents will engage in less overt coercion,72 as their children fall victim to
the "lollipop syndrome," preferring the parent who showers them with
goodies and good times;73 the "rescue syndrome," preferring the parent
perceived to be the "weaker" of the two;74  or the "reconciliation
syndrome," attempting to reconcile parents by basing preference on a hope
that the nonpreferred parent will abandon the divorce.75
71. See Molloy, 637 N.W.2d at 805; BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 22, at 45 ("It
is far from seldom that children Will not give their true choice, because they fear a parent's
retribution .... ").
72. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 reporter's notes cmt. f ("A child's
preferences will be discounted, or disregarded, where it appears to be the result of pressure
by one of the parties, by counsel, or by another.").
73. .As one court explained: "The so-called 'lollipop syndrome' relates to the
situation where one parent . . . may shower the child with gifts and pleasant times, and
impose no discipline in order to win the child's preference." Taylor, 508 A.2d at 973 n. 12.
Massachusetts judges, in a 1982 survey, cited "a fear of bribery by parents" as one
explanation for their reluctance to rely on a child's preference. See Nemechek, supra note
18, at 461 & n. 195.'For an example of the lollipop syndrome in operation, see Leo v. Leo,
213 N.W.2d 495 (Iowa 1973) (noting that child preferred dad who allowed him to drink
alcohol and view "go-go girls" in his nightclub).
One commentator has argued" however, that attempts to "'unduly influence' the
child's choice" by "showering attentions on the child during the divorce period ... should
be encouraged rather than lamented." Kandel, supra note 33, at 372 (citation omitted).
Professor Kandel's example of undue influence, "spending quality time in shared activities
or providing extra help with homework," however, not only excludes the "go-go-bar" cases,
but also overlooks the strategic nature of such attentions and their consequent
impermanence, which may come as a surprise to the child seduced by them. Id. Professor
Kandel further reasons that children are "unlikely" to be "fooled" by parental attempts to
buy a child's affection and that "[t]he undue influence of financial inducement can be
curtailed during the divorce period through pendente lite support orders." Id. at 372-73.
While Professor Kandel is surely correct in her observation that many children are
surprisingly adept at detecting insincerity, children are, after all, children, who are by
definition developmentally disparately positioned and therefore vulnerable to the adults who
attempt to manipulate them.
74. See Taylor, 508 A.2d at 973 n. 12 (describing rescue syndrome). Parents may
cultivate this image of weakness in order to win the child's favor. As one commentator
explained, "[t]he mother who says, 'Who will take care of me if you don't live with me?'
or the father who says, 'I guess -you will never see me again after the divorce,' is in effect
trying to manipulate the children into expressing a custodial preference out of pity."
FRIEDMAN, supra note 45, at 33. When this manipulation succeeds, its consequences may
be very harmful to the child, for "[i]f children choose to live with the pitiful parent, they
often play the part of parent and assume many burdens that are inappropriate to their age or
stage of development." Id.; see also Dr. Alayne Yates, Child's Preference-Developmental
Issues, 10 FAM. ADVOCATE 30, 33-34 (1998) (observing that a child who assumes the role
of parent may eventually display "resentment in self-defeating or self-destructive ways").
75. Lombard, supra note 8, at 828.
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Even when the child's preference is consistent and voluntary, it may
be "unreliable, short-sighted or irrational."76 A child's ability to form a
reasonable preference depends on her cognitive maturity, that is, her
ability "to perceive and to comprehend current reality by sorting out some
elements of truth from other elements of truth."77 The child's immaturity,
stress, and loyalty conflicts may prevent her from sorting out truths on
which to base preference. When able to express a preference, even a more
mature child may panic and make a rash decision in the hope of escaping
further involvement in the custody battle.
Other children will consciously mislead the judge, using an
expression of preference as a means to punish a strict disciplinarian or a
parent they blame for the divorce. Other children will be motivated by a
"fear [of] losing utterly a parent whom they don't prefer," or by a desire to
be with the financially better-positioned parent or the parent who "gives
more freedom."79 Sometimes the basis for the child's preference will be
clear enough, but reasonable minds will differ as to whether that basis is
reasonable. In the commonly occurring case, for example, in which a
child bases preference on a dislike for a parent's new partner, courts
disagree over whether such a preference is reasonable.8"
Judicial efforts to flush out a preference and to verify its consistency,
voluntariness, and reasonableness are complicated by the difficulty of
communicating with children whose perceptions, language, memory,
76. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f. The ALI expresses caution
about soliciting children's preferences "based on their immaturity [and] their unreliability,"
id. § 2.14 cmt. b, but ultimately supports accommodation of the "firm and reasonable
preference of a child who has reached a specific age," id. § 2.08(l)(b). The ALI's reliance
on "reasonable" preferences reflects the practice in some states. See, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS. ANN. § 722.23(i) (directing court to consider the "reasonable preference of the child,
if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference"). Numerous
commentators have noted the unreliability of children's preferences. See, e.g., Jones, supra
note 61, at 52 ("[Clhildren under emotional stress may provide distorted images of their
parents and the situations existing in their families, their feelings may be transient, the
reasons for their custodial preferences may be worthy of no weight at all."); Wallace J.
Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1873, 1886-87 (1996) (relaying warning of Massachusetts family court judge that
"children's expressed preferences should not be taken at face value since children
improperly assess their own long-term interests, rely on unrealistic expectations and
promises, and may manipulate or be manipulated by parents").
77. Schuman, supra note 42, at 15.
78. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f (noting that a child may
"wish to mislead the interviewer").
79. BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 22, at 45; see also Linda Whobrey et al., The
Best Interests of the Child in Custody Disputes, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY
DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES AND EXPERTISE 59, 75 (L. Weithorn ed., 1987)
("The child may choose the more lenient party, the party whose bribe seems most attractive,
or one party in order to strike out at the other.").
80. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 reporter's notes cmt. f.
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attention span, and moral values differ significantly from those of the
judge.8" Judges' best efforts to communicate are compromised by their
lack of training in child interview techniques 82 and by children's
susceptibility to suggestion and misleading questions.8 3 Judges may be
unaware that their conversation is encouraging certain responses, or that
they are distorting and misinterpreting the child's answers84 to confirm
their own biases. 5 Matters are made worse when judges do not invite free
narrative, instead posing a series of forced-choice questions,86 which
increase the likelihood of inaccurate responses.87 Moreover, judges may
81. See Jones, supra note 61, at 59; see also Schuman, supra note 42, at 15
("Children's reports of events and relationships, and their unwilling use of words which
may convey misleading implications, often stem from childhood status. ... ). See
generally Jones, supra note 61, at 58-68 (discussing communications difficulties posed by
children's immaturity).
82. As Joan Kelly observes:
[J]udges are not trained in child interviewing skills, and generally lack
knowledge about developmental differences in cognitive, language, and
emotional capacities. Thus, it is hard for even the most experienced judge to
place children's responses in an appropriate context and evaluate the weight that
should be given to their wishes.
Kelly, supra note 45; see also Warren & Marsil, supra note 57, at 147 ("[l]nterviewer
training is effective in reducing problematic questioning techniques only when training is
both intensive and extensive, and only when it includes practice, individualized feedback,
and follow-up.").
83. See Warren & Marsil, supra note 57, at 128-29 (noting that children are
generally more suggestible and more likely to be misled than adults). The judge's status as
an authoritative figure may increase her potential to mislead suggestible children. See
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 57, § 14-2.3.3, at 178 ("Older, more knowledgeable
interviewers are able to mislead children more than low status adults or peers."). Ajudge's
entreaty to the child to be honest and careful will not fully buffer the child against
suggestion. See Warren & Marsil, supra note 57, at 139-40 (noting that warnings reduce
but do not eliminate suggestibility).
84. In one particularly poignant example of such a distortion: a two-year-old child
said, "G.A. touched me"; her interviewer responded, "Jesus loves me? Is that what you
said?"; the child replied "Yeah." Amye R. Warren et al., "It Sounds Good in Theory, But
.. . ": Do Investigative Interviewers Follow Guidelines Based on Memory Research?, 1
CHILD MALTREATMENT 231, 235 (1996).
85. As-Jonathan Gould explains, "[c]onfirmatory bias refers to the tendency to
look for data that support your expectations." GOULD, supra note 5, at 233. Gould cites as
an example the case of a mother's allegation that the father had a drinking problem, which
an evaluator confirmed on the basis of a single 9:00 a.m. phone conversation with the father
whose speech sounded slow and "slurred." Id. at 233-34.
86. For a brief description of the distinction between invitational questioning and
closed questioning, see supra note 57.
87. Researchers universally recommend that interviews begin with open-ended
"invitational" questions. Warren & Marsil, supra note 57, at 144. Faigman, Kaye, Saks,
and Sanders explain the problem of forced-choice questions:
[W]hen details requested in a specific question are not available in the child's
memory, the child may attempt to answer the question anyway. Second,
responses to specific questions mask poor comprehension as children can adopt
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erroneously assume an informal interview will enhance truth-finding by
increasing the child's comfort level, although researchers have observed
that "the more friendly and trusting an interviewer is, the more eager the
child may be to provide answers that the interviewer wants to hear. ,88
The difficulties of identifying a child's preference are not limited to
cases of very young children. Some studies suggest that even adolescents
are significantly more suggestible than adults.89 And older children, like
younger children, may experience the ambivalence and loyalty conflicts
that impede their ability to state a clear preference.9" Even cognitively-
mature adolescents may be socially immature and thus easily persuaded by
peers, 9' preoccupied with immediate rather than long-term consequences,
and driven by perceptions of immortality that impede accurate risk
assessments. 92
Nevertheless, while age may not guarantee the legitimacy of a
preference, an older child surely deserves more deference than a very
young child. 93 Indeed, "at some age, children become developmentally
strategies to cover up their limitations, such as repeating back phrases or words
used by the interviewer, providing a stereotypical response, or providing
affirmative answers to yes/no questions even if they do not understand them.
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 57, § 14-2.3.7, at 183.
88. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 57, § 14-2.3.3, at 179. The authors also note,
however that "the more at ease the child feels, and the more he or she understands the
purpose and 'ground rules' of the interview, the more likely the child is to provide
information that is accurate, detailed, and relevant." Id. § 14-2.3.6, at 182 (citation
omitted).
89. See Warren & Marsil, supra note 57, at 128 (noting findings that
"suggestibility generally declines over the school years but that even adolescents can be
significantly more suggestible than adults," but also noting other studies showing that
"under certain conditions, older children and adults can be more suggestible than younger
children").
90. When loyalty conflicts do arise, older children may be unaware of them. As
Professor Buss observes, "[e]ven a child mature enough to understand the uniqueness and
privacy of his own mind may lack the sophistication to appreciate the conflicts and
ambiguity in his views." Buss, supra note 52, at 928.
91. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 57, § 14-2.6.5, at 199-200.
92. See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal
Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 231 (1995).
93. As the ALI observes, "the preferences of older children are more likely to
conform to their best interests than those of younger children." ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note
3, § 2.08 cmt. f. In a study of Virginia judges, Scott, Reppucci, and Aber found that the
impact of the child's preference increased with the child's age; while most judges considered
the preference of a child under age six irrelevant, almost ninety percent of judges afforded
the preference of children age fourteen or older great or dispositive weight. Scott et al.,
supra note 30, at 1049-50; see also GOULD, supra note 5, at 245 (reporting that child
custody evaluators gave significant weight to the wishes of a child over the age of fifteen,
"considered the wishes of 10-year-olds," and "paid little attention to the wishes of 5-year-
olds"); Carol R. Lowery, Child Custody Decisions in Divorce Proceedings: A Survey of
Judges, 12 PROF. PSYCHOL. 492, 492-93, 495 (1981) (reporting that eighty-six percent of
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indistinguishable from adults."94 The problem lies not so much in this
normative concept as in its practical application. When are children
developmentally able to choose? Does this readiness require only the
ability to think rationally, or does it further require the ability to engage in
abstract thinking, to contemplate a range of hypotheticals? 95 Is cognitive
development sufficient, or should social development also be relevant?96 Is
it possible to identify a bright-line age of presumptive ability to choose?
Numerous commentators believe it is possible. Drawing on the work of
child psychologist Piaget and others, 97 commentators have drawn the "old-
enough" line at various points. Professor Kandel, for example, believes
the preference of a child age six or older should be dispositive, at least in
cases where both parents are fit. 9s Dean Lombard urges that only children
Kentucky judges surveyed considered the preferences of children age twelve and older more
important than the preferences of younger children); Thomas J. Reidy et al., Child Custody
Decisions: A Survey of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q. 75, 78, 79 tbl.2, 83, 84 tbl.5 (1989) (survey
of California judges). But see Nemechek, supra note 18, at 460-61, 461 n. 186 (reporting
that 115 Indiana judges surveyed consistently ranked child's preference as unimportant
compared with other custody factors).
94. Buss, supra note 52, at 903 (reciting argument of guardian ad litem school).
95. See id. at 903-04 (noting arguments that while the typical seven-year-old can
think rationally, the ability to think abstractly may be delayed until adolescence).
96. For an argument that cognitive function should not alone determine decision-
making competence, see generally Scott et al., supra note 92, at 222-35.
97. Jean Piaget, among others, has tracked children's development through a series
of stages of moral and cognitive maturity. Professor Mlyniec provides a helpful overview
of Piaget's stages: Level One (birth to age two)-children develop the ability to "plan simple
physical tasks using objects"; Level Two (ages two to seven)-children develop the ability to
think logically; Level Three (ages seven to eleven)-"children begin to understand
causation, gain a more objective view of the universe, and attain a better understanding of
other's perceptions"; Level Four (ages eleven to fifteen)-children develop the ability to
"imagine the past, present, and future conditions of a problem and create hypotheses about
what might logically occur." Mlyniec, supra note 76, at 1879. Professor Mlyniec
concludes that under Piagetian theory, children age fifteen and older are capable of "adult
thought." Id. But see Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent
Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1632 (1992) (questioning the sufficiency of
empirical data to support adolescents' ability to make decisions as well as adults).
98. Kandel, supra note 33, at 369 (arguing that the preference of children age six
and older should be given dispositive effect, at least where parents are both fit). According
to Kandel, "[a]t about the age of six years, cerebral changes take place which result in
increased physical and cognitive capacities, enabling children to think more deeply and
logically, and to simultaneously keep track of many aspects of a situation." Id. at 363
(citation omitted). Kandel does not dispute, however, that "'development' (like
'adjustment') is sensitive to context, environment, and individual variation, so that general
theories cannot explain the individual case." Id. at 362.
In the related context of child-protection proceedings, Sarah Ramsey has identified age
seven as the age at which children are capable of decision-making. See Sarah H. Ramsey,
Representation of the Child in Protection Proceedings: The Determination of Decision-
Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287, 320 (1983).
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age twelve and older should be interviewed.99 Professor Mlyniec maintains
that the preference of a child under age ten should be given no weight, but
that the preference of a child age fourteen and older should be controlling
"after an informed consent dialogue."' 0 ' The ALl implicitly suggests, by
way of example, age "11, 12, 13, or even 14 as the appropriate age" at
which the firm and reasonable preference of a child should be
accommodated.' Even as the ALl encourages state-wide rules setting
forth a specified age, however, it is careful to note that since "maturity
develops gradually rather than all at once ...no single age will either
identify all mature minors or exclude all immature ones."'' 2 While
disagreement among legal actors about the appropriate age of choice does
not itself prove the impossibility of line-drawing, it does suggest that
identifying this age may be more arbitrary than one would like to believe.
However unfortunate, the truth may be that "[d]evelopmental psychology
does not offer what lawyers would most like: definitive, fixed information
upon which to ground simple, age-based rules. "103
It is much easier, of course, to finesse the "old-enough" question by
delegating it to an individual trial judge on a case-by-case basis. The
rationale is that children progress toward rationality and autonomy at
different rates," and thus no categorical definition of maturity is possible.
While many current statutory schemes follow this model,'0 5 it is no
99. Lombard, supra note 8, at 837 (citing the difficulties of communicating with
preteens and social science findings that preteens experience more intense loyalty conflicts
than older children).
100. Mlyniec, supra note 76, at 1907-08. In Professor Mlyniec's view, the
preference of a child between ages ten and fourteen should also be controlling after an
informed consent dialogue if the child's competence is first established by an expert. Id. at
1908.
101. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f.
102. Id.
103. Buss, supra note 52, at 919.
104. GOULD, supra note 5, at 117 (observing that while a child's "social, emotional
and cognitive psychological functioning ... interact with chronological age ... there are
substantial individual differences among children").
105. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(3) (Michie 1995) ("[C]ourt shall
consider ... the child's preference if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a
preference[.]"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(b) (West 1995) ("[C]ourt shall ... be
guided by the best interest of the child, giving consideration to the wishes of the child if the
child is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent preference .... "); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(3) (Michie 1999) (requiring the court to consider preference of a
child "of sufficient age and capacity to reason, so as to form an intelligent preference");
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-364(2)(b) (Michie 1999) ("[Clourt shall consider ... [t]he
desires and wishes of the minor child if of an age of comprehension regardless of
chronological age, when such desires and wishes are based on sound reasoning[.]"); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(8) (Michie 2000) ("[C]ourt shall consider ... preference of the
child, if the court deems the child to be of reasonable intelligence, understanding, age and
experience to express such a preference[.]").
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panacea. Most obviously, it simply begs the maturity question by
delegating it to an individual decision-maker with a busy docket and little
or no training in child development. 106
(ii) Free narrative: there is something else you should know.
Even when the judge is seeking only the child's preference, the child
may spontaneously reveal other information relevant to the child's best
interests. Custody statutes often include in their list of relevant factors: the
relationship and interactions between parent and child; a party's ability to
direct the child's education and upbringing, and to provide the child with
physical care; the existence of an established environment; the moral
fitness of the parties; the child's adjustment to her home and community;
the mental and physical health of the parties; a party's willingness to
facilitate a continuing relationship with the other parent; and any domestic
violence.'07 It is difficult to imagine much of a conversation between judge
and child that would not in some way relate to these broad-based factors.
106. As Professor Mlyniec observes, "when judges determine that a child is mature
or intellectually capable of making decisions, the factors considered in reaching those
decisions frequently do not reflect the accumulated research about child development."
Mlyniec, supra note 76, at 1903-04.
107. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23. The Michigan statute requires
the court to consider:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties
involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love,
affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in
his or her religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted
under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment,
and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be
of sufficient age to express preference.
0) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a
close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other
parent or the child and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against
or witnessed by the child.
(1) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.
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Even a brief interview is likely to generate information relevant to custody,
both as a judge initially attempts to put the child at ease, and later as she
attempts to gauge the reasonableness of an expressed preference. °'
Indirect preference questioning, often urged by commentators,' 9 is almost
certain to draw relevant information from the child in addition to
preference.
Sometimes the child's statements are significant indeed. Many of the
judges in Dean Lombard's survey, for example, reported that during the
preference interview they obtained information about "mistreatment or
abuse, including sexual misconduct, by a parent or her live-in friend, as
well as information pointing toward drug or alcohol abuse by the custodial
parent. "110
What is a judge to do with such information? It is unrealistic and
probably inappropriate to insist that judges ignore it. While most judges
are unlikely to take a child's statements at face value, inaccuracies
produced by a child's stress, by a parent's manipulation or coaching, or by
a judge's unskilled communications are not always apparent. Yet if the
child's statements are kept confidential, their credibility is untested, even
when their impact on custody is significant. The "substantial probability
that judges receive inaccurate information" in preference interviews"'
makes information risks a serious concern indeed.
c. Outcome Risks: Blaming the Child
In addition to process and information risks, preference-driven
decision-making creates serious outcome risks for children. As the ALI
observed, "[c]hildren may feel responsible for the outcome of a custody
dispute if they believe they have participated in its resolution, whatever
108. See Lombard, supra note 8, at 814 ("[In many cases, judges received
information that went well beyond the child's preference, whether they sought it or not.").
As a Michigan court observed:
Assuming arguendo that the child is able to express a preference, the
interview should not take place in a vacuum. Inquiry must be made in order to
test the authenticity, the motives, and the consistency of the preference. Often a
good interview will result in information that affects other child custody factors
and therein lies the problem.
Molloy, 637 N.W.2d. at 805-06.
109. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f ("Generally speaking,
the preferences of a child, even when relevant, should not be directly solicited. The risks of
involving children in disputes for which they may feel personally responsible may be
diminished by ascertaining their preferences indirectly."). Even indirect questioning
imposes process costs on children. See supra Part 1.B. 1.a.
110. Lombard, supra note 8, at 814 (reporting that fifty-four percent of the judges
surveyed obtain such information during the in-camera interview).
111. Id. at 817.
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that might be."" 2 These outcome costs may persist long after the stress of
the interview has passed. As the child's sense of the significance of her
preference increases, so does her sense of responsibility. When the child
understands that her preference will be dispositive, her burden is onerous.
Especially hard-hit is the child whose preference is expressed only
privately to the judge, but is publicly revealed by the custody outcome,
which parties understand to be preference-driven.
In addition to an unwanted sense of responsibility, the child may
experience the hurt, disappointment, or even the wrath of the losing parent
who blames her for loss of the custody battle. When the losing parent has
coached the child prior to the preference interview, the loss of custody may
trigger suspicion that the child has not only rejected her, but betrayed her,
a suspicion not likely to enhance the noncustodial parent-child
relationship." 3 Even as the losing parent is blaming the child, the child
may be blaming herself, especially when the custody arrangement she
chose proves disappointing." 4
Outcome costs are not averted when the court invites the child's
choice but does not award custody in accord with that choice. In such
cases, the child may feel unimportant, as if her wishes are too insignificant
to be honored." 5  And as the child takes up residence with the non-
preferred parent, she may experience daily the guilt of disloyalty and the
resentment of the non-preferred parent. Outcome costs may thus be a
largely unavoidable consequence of asking children to choose between
parents, whether or not their choice is honored." 6
Given the risks of burdening the child with guilt for the custody
decision, of compounding the child's stress, and of obtaining inaccurate
information from the child, is it really wise to invite the child to express a
preference? Answering this question first requires consideration of the
potential benefits of preference-based decision-making.
112. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f. But see Kandel, supra note 33,
at 367 (observing a lack of supporting research for the assumption that allowing children to
choose their custodian produces guilt and stress).
113. For this insight I am indebted to Joan E. Young, Chief Circuit Judge, Oakland
County Sixth Circuit Court, Michigan.
114. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f ("Children whose preferences
are followed may feel responsible for the consequences, whether that be their own
unhappiness or that of a parent.").
115. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f ("Children whose preferences are
not followed may come to believe that the court considered them unimportant or
ineffective."); see also Kandel, supra note 33, at 367 n.313 ("The child may reason the
judge's failure to grant his wish indicates that his opinion is foolish and immature. The
child may suffer a decrease in self-esteem, and/or disillusionment with the legal system. ").
Professor Kandel argues that this consequence could be avoided by a rule that gave
dispositive effect to the "preference of any child over the age of six years." Id. at 301.
116. For a discussion of process costs, see supra Part I.B. l.a.
2003:115
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2. POTENTIAL BENEFITS
Giving children a voice in their custody furthers the fundamental
principle that parties significantly affected by litigation should have "the
opportunity to be heard."... This principle is not reserved for adults only.
Increasingly, the law views the transition from childhood to adulthood, not
as a bright line, but rather as a gradual progression, during which children
become more and more deserving of adult rights. Adolescents are
especially entitled to some degree of autonomy, 118 a theme at least as old as
In re Gault.119 Principles of fundamental fairness make a powerful case
117. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean,
234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Lombard, supra note
8, at 812 (describing this opportunity as "the most cogent justification" for considering a
child's preference).
118. See Scott et al., supra note 30, at 1061 (observing that "[t]he law increasingly
gives minors the liberty to make decisions which directly or indirectly restrict the authority
of their parents and the state"); see also Kandel, supra note 33, at 305 (discussing "the
protectivist/patienthood paradigm which assumes the incompetency and delicacy of the
child, and the empowerment/personhood paradigm which envisions the child as a developing
(legal) person"). Kandel has argued that enabling children to choose a custodian offers the
additional benefit of facilitating children's maturation, which "prepares them to be
responsible citizens of a democracy." Id. at 367. This argument is persuasive, however,
only for children who are already mature enough to express a reasoned preference. The
maturation-facilitation argument is much less persuasive in the case of children whose
immaturity will be "treated" by inflicting upon them the hugely onerous burden of choosing
a custodian. While an immature child may indeed mature greatly if the responsibility for the
custody decision is imposed upon her, the costs of this practice may well exceed the gains.
While a learn-through-your-mistakes approach might make sense in the case of preference
for clothes or friends or summer vacations, it is much less sound when the issue is as hugely
important as with whom the child will live. Giving children power to make significant
choices before they are developmentally ready is a risky proposition.
119. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (according minors facing delinquency charges the right to an
attorney and other adult procedural safeguards). Constitutional jurisprudence on children is
a hotchpotch of empowerment and protection, sometimes treating children, especially
adolescents, as autonomous players with many of the rights of adults. See, e.g., Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion) (recognizing the right of mature children to
make decisions without parental consent); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 511-14 (1969) (recognizing right of school children to wear armbands to
protest the nation's involvement in the conflict in Vietnam). At other times childhood is
treated as an inferior status over which fit parents have near-complete control. See, e.g.,
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (allowing school to perform random
drug tests on student-athlete); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding parental
right to place children in mental hospital). See generally Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution
as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 337, 338, 365-69 (2002).
In its recent opinion in Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, the plurality left undisturbed this "murky,
inconsistent jurisprudence of childhood." Dolgin, supra, at 369. Only Justice Stevens, in a
dissenting opinion, focused on the interests of the Troxel children, observing that although
the "Court has not ... elucidate[d] the nature of a child's interests in preserving established
familial or family-like bonds, it seems . . . extremely likely that, to the extent parents and
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for giving children, especially older children, an opportunity to speak to a
matter as significant to them as the identity of their custodian.' 2
Preference-based decision-making also offers normative appeal, as it
furthers the movement toward private ordering in family law."'2 No-fault
divorce laws offer a striking example of this deference to private decision-
making in their provision for divorce-at-will and usually notwithstanding
the protest of the other spouse.'22 Spouses also enjoy broad freedom to
determine the economic consequences of their divorce.'23 Even the
custody decision is left largely to private ordering, though it is generally
reviewable, at least in theory, by a court to ensure the child's best interests
are protected.'24 When parents are unable to reach a private agreement
families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too,
do children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the
equation." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice
Stevens thus urged the Court to "reject any suggestion that when it comes to parental rights,
children are so much chattel." Id. at 89.
120. This principle is consistent with Article 12 of the 1989 Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which requires that children have an opportunity to participate in legal
proceedings. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 168, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989). The United States, however, has
not ratified the Convention. See Kelly, supra note 45, at 148. Some commentators
complain that children too often remain voiceless and after the divorce "would be startled to
learn that the courts were ever seriously concerned with their interests." WALLERSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 39, at 312. The authors claim that the "court system has unintentionally
contributed to the suffering of children" by allowing parents to speak for children "just as
those who fight bloody holy wars allegedly speak in the name of religion." Id. at 302. This
absence of children's independent voice may partly explain the perception of numerous
critics that the law too often protects parents at the expense of their children. See, e.g.,
Woodhouse, supra note 24, at 1748-49.
121. See Scott et al., supra note 30, at 1061. For a recent discussion of the move
toward private ordering in family law, see David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in the
Constitution of Faith and Family, 86 MINN. L. REV. 791, 796-804 (2002).
122. Although not usually expressly acknowledged, most states in effect recognize a
unilateral right to divorce without a showing of fault. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at
206-07. Professor Dolgin has observed that the underlying deference to individual
autonomy evident in these no-fault laws is curiously inconsistent with "traditional
understandings of children as treasured, innocent and vulnerable." Dolgin, supra note 119,
at 351.
123. See, e.g., UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3, 9C U.L.A. 43 (2001)
(recognizing parties' right to contract regarding specified issues, including property and
support claims); UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 306(a), 9A U.L.A. (1998) (authorizing
parties to enter settlement agreement).
124. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.06 reporter's notes cmt. a (stating
traditional rule that parental agreement concerning children requires judicial review, but
acknowledging that "agreements are rarely rejected on other grounds"). One study reported
that of 349 settlement agreements, only one agreement was rejected by a court. Marygold
S. Melli et al., The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of
No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133, 1145 (1988). The ALI supports an expressly
deferential approach, requiring courts to adopt a parental agreement unless it is "not
knowing or voluntary, or would be harmful to the child." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, §
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regarding custody, some commentators have reasoned that their
disqualification allows the child to replace them as private decision-
maker. 125
Commentators have further argued that deference to the child's
preference offers the additional benefit of furthering the child's best
interests, since the parent to whom the child is most attached is likely to be
the parent most attached to the child, and consequently the parent who
would best provide for the child.126 This argument, however, assumes the
child's expression of preference is reasonable and not the product of adult
manipulation, a dubious assumption in contested custody cases.127 What is
clear is that pragmatism requires deference to the fiercely-held preference
of a mature child, since a custody arrangement such a child opposes is not
likely to be workable.'28
An additional reason to invite children to express a preference is that
while speaking to the preference question, they may provide other relevant
and valuable information.19 Sometimes this additional information is
2.06(l)(a)-(b).
125. Scott et al., supra note 30, at 1062.
126. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, Parental (and Grandparental) Rights After Troxel
v. Granville, 9 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 69, 97 (2001) (suggesting that rough generalization
that "the parent with the greater attachment to the child is likely to be the parent to whom
the child has the greater attachment . . . simplifies the court's task so much that the
reductions in litigation costs exceed any reduction in accuracy"). Gilles' greater-attachment
rationale could be furthered more prudently by a primary caretaker presumption that
supposes the parent who has spent the most time with the child is the parent most attached to
the child and therefore the best custodian. See infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
127. For a discussion of parental efforts to sway the child's preference, see supra
notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
128. As the ALI acknowledges, "it is often unrealistic to expect a court-ordered
arrangement will work well when an older child is firmly opposed to it." ALl PRINCIPLES,
supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f; see also Lombard, supra note 8, at 811 (observing that "trial
judges generally agree that it is crucial for the court to ascertain the preferences of older
children" and citing by way of example the teenager who frustrates the custody order by
leaving home).
129. As the ALl observed:
[Ilnformation [from the child's perspective] may be helpful in ascertaining
whether a parental agreement should be reviewed by the court ... whether the
child of a certain age has firm and reasonable preferences that should be taken
into account ... whether there is a gross disparity in the abilities of the parents
or the strength of the emotional relationships between the parent and the
child ... how well the child has adjusted to a temporary custodial arrangement
. . . or whether there exists one of the factors requiring special protective
measures ....
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.14 cmt. b. Even when information is "available from
other sources, the court may decide that the child may have a useful perspective on such
matters that others cannot provide." Id; see also Lombard, supra note 8, at 810 (reporting
view of surveyed judges that interview with child "gave them a 'feel' for the case they
would not otherwise have" (footnote omitted)).
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otherwise unavailable, either because parents strategically withhold it or
simply because the child is the only party with knowledge of the facts. 130
While the child's statements require some form of credibility testing, her
"ingenuousness and propensity to speak forthrightly" 131 may open doors to
other significant information that would otherwise be unknown. In a
circuitous way, asking children to state their preference thus enables the
State to hear other valuable things they have to say. This tenuous rationale
raises an obvious question: Why not invite the child's free narrative rather
than direct her speech through preference questions?
3. TAKING BACK THE SWORD
Children deserve a voice in the crucial issue of their custody.
Accordingly, when children speak to issues that concern them, judges
should listen, whether or not their statements convey a preference.'
When a mature child publicly expresses a strongly-held preference or
spontaneously volunteers such a preference during an in-camera interview,
a judge should listen carefully indeed. But as most parents ordinarily
understand well enough, listening is not the same as asking. Children who
do not express a preference should not be asked, directly or indirectly, to
do so.133 Indeed, if the ALI is correct, the preference question is largely
unnecessary, since "in most cases, children with firm preferences will find
130. A child, for example, may be the best source of information about her
relationship to a sibling. See Hilliard v. Schmidt, 586 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Mich. Ct. App.
1998) (upholding validity of judge's interview with child whose custody was not at issue in
order to assess the child's relationship with his brother and "the boys' need or desire to be
together," a holding called into question by Molloy, 637 N.W.2d 803).
131. See STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOM: A
SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, at x (1995).
132. As Wendy Fitzgerald observes, "U]ustice requires legal listening to children,
whether or not their views prevail." Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Stories of Child Outlaws:
On Child Heroism and Adult Power in Juvenile Justice, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 495, 502.
133. At least one commentator has recognized the distinction between cases of
volunteered preferences and other cases. See Mlyniec, supra note 76, at 1908 n.206 (urging
that children who state a preference should be heard, but counseling that because "[d]ivorce
is a traumatic event for most children ... they should not be forced to make a choice or
even be encouraged to do so"). Of course, giving great weight to a child's voluntary
expression of preference can offer parents a tempting invitation to coach and coax a child
into a "voluntary" statement. While some children will inform the judge of such parental
pressure during the in-camera interview, others will not. While not entirely satisfactory, the
answer to this parental temptation is that the judge will not give even a child's
spontaneously-expressed preferences dispositive weight, except in unusual cases of children
who are near majority and whose preferences are fiercely held. This limitation will
decrease, though it will not eliminate such parental temptations. For a discussion of this
proposal, see infra Part III.
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a way to make those preferences known without significant effort by those
involved in the case.'
134
Even when a child volunteers a firm and reasonable preference, that
preference should not determine custody, except in extraordinary cases.135
Delegating the custody decision to children imposes tremendous process
and outcome costs on them and represents a misguided abdication of
judicial responsibility "masquerad[ing] in the guise of free speech" for
children. 1
36
Children deserve more than a preference interview. They deserve an
opportunity to speak broadly to issues that concern them, free of option-
posing questions designed to flush out any unexpressed preference.
Preference interviews should thus be recast as opportunities for free
narrative, empowering children to speak freely without burdening them
with unwanted choice. As children define the scope of their conversation,
their sense of well-being 37 and satisfaction with the custody outcome are
likely to increase, 138 even when they do not control that outcome.
39
Redesigning in-camera interviews as invitations to free narrative rather
than preference-driven searches and declining to make the child's
134. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f. Black and Cantor have observed
that parents do not normally litigate cases in which "the child has a pronounced preference
and is near majority." BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 22, at 42. Assuming that children do
not hide strongly-held preferences and that parents do not normally litigate cases involving
mature children with strong preferences, custody interviews in litigated cases may thus serve
only to uncover preferences that are too weak or too immature to warrant deference.
135. See infra Part III. Black and Cantor cynically capture the irony of delegating
the custody decision to children by noting that this practice allows "children [to] determine
their custody when those same children would not be allowed to decide what they should
have for dinner." BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 22, at 45.
136. Schuman, supra note 42, at 18. In Schuman's view, forcing children to make
the custody decision denies children their "basic rights ... to guidance, nurturance and a
civic education in the graduated exercise of rights and responsibilities of free speech and
liberty." Id. at 19.
137. Lombard, supra note 8, at 810-11 (suggesting the importance of allowing a
child "an opportunity to vent her feelings about the perplexing and anxiety provoking
situation in which she finds herself" but noting that few judges in her survey "seemed
enamored of this 'social work' potential").
138. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on
the Rights of Children, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1585, 1604 (1995) (arguing that a child's
participation in neglect proceedings increases the likelihood of her satisfaction with the
outcome).
139. See Leonard P. Edwards & Inger J. Sagatun, Who Speaks for the Child? 2 U.
CHi. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 67, 74 (1995) (arguing that a child whose view is presented to
the judge will experience empowerment whether or not her view controls the outcome). But
see Buss, supra note 52, at 942 ("When listening to children reflects caring but not
deference, and when children experience adult listeners as respectful but uninfluenced,
children may feel valued but not empowered.").
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preference dispositive except in ordinary cases will significantly reduce
process and outcome risks for children.
Taking back the custody sword will not, however, resolve the serious
problem of information risks posed by confidential in-camera
conversations. If children are to continue to have a voice in custody
proceedings, information they convey in-camera that is not disclosed to
parents during trial will continue to pose a serious risk that judges will base
custody on inaccurate information. Parental demands for access to
children's in-camera statements thus deserve serious attention.
II. PROTECTING PARENTS' RIGHTS
Please don't take my sunshine away.
Jimmie Davis4 '
When parents fight each other for physical custody of their children,
the stakes are huge. One parent will win the right to control the child's
upbringing and to determine the extent of parent-child contact; the other
parent will lose that right.14' Parents are willing to pay an enormous price
to win physical custody, subjecting themselves and their children to the
"ugliest of all litigation. " 42 Rules of war and norms of fair play are
thwarted, parents insist, when judges interview children in chambers,
withhold children's statements from parents, and then rely on those
statements to choose a custodian. Not fair and not acceptable, say
parents. '43
Prudence surely requires that children's in-camera statements undergo
some form of accuracy testing if they are to be weighed in the custody
decision. The question here is whether the Constitution requires that
140. JIMMIE DAVIS, You Are My Sunshine (Decca Records 1940). Davis wrote this
song prior to his two terms as Governor of Louisiana.
141. This characterization describes a traditional custody model in which one parent
is the "sole custodian" and the other parent is the noncustodian, ordinarily with visitation
rights. Fineman, supra note 3, at 731-33. As Professor Fineman explains, even less binary
models, such as the shared parenting and joint custody models urged by social workers,
continue in practice the sole maternal custody/paternal visitation model. See id. at 733-34.
142. GOLDZBAND, supra note 8, at ix. Wolman and Taylor have suggested that
parents may actually not know what they are getting into when they embark on custody
litigation. See Wolman & Taylor, supra note 5, at 406 ("Parents contesting custody most
often enter the legal process naively and with little realistic preparation for the personal and
financial stress associated with an undertaking of such magnitude.").
143. The perception of fairness, or lack thereof, may have an important
consequence, as parents who suspect unfairness "are more likely to engage in strategic,
resentful or uncooperative behavior, from which children may suffer; conversely, when
parents believe that rules are fair, they are more likely to invest themselves in their children
and to act fairly toward others." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02 cmt. b.
2003:115
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parents serve as accuracy-testers. The crux of parents' claim is that the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees' entitle them to
custody procedures that are fundamentally fair, and to an opportunity to
challenge the veracity and context of their children's in-camera statements
that undercut their claim for physical custody. Such parental access could
be in the form of a transcript, videotape, or other record of the interview,
which would be made available to parents during trial.'45 Whether due
process entitles parents to such an opportunity to challenge their children's
in-camera statements depends on two questions: (1) Is process
constitutionally due a parent during custody litigation? and (2) If so, what
process is due?
A. The Parental Claim to Fundamental Fairness
Parents' claim to fundamental fairness depends initially on a
determination that inter-parental custody litigation is subject to the
requisites of the Due Process Clause.' 46 The Supreme Court has made
clear that "[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of liberty and property."' Does a parent's loss of physical
custody deprive her of such a protected liberty interest?
The Supreme Court has long recognized that parents have a
fundamental right to the "companionship, care, custody, and management"
of their children.' 48 This right, "'far more precious than any property
right, ''149 "is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by [the] Court." 5' Were the setting a termination proceeding
144. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nlor shall any person ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law .... "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
("[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law .... ").
145. For a discussion of these and other options, see infra Part II.B.3.
146. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) ("[D]ue process
... expresses the requirement of 'fundamental fairness'...." (citation omitted)).
147. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the State from depriving any person "of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). See
generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 7.4.1,
at 556 (2d ed. 2002) ("[P]rocedural due process issues arise when an individual or group is
claiming a right to a fair process in connection with their suffering a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property.").
148. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 147, § 7.3.3, at 545.
149. Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (neglect
proceeding)).
150. 530 U.S. at 65 (plurality opinion). In Troxel, Justice O'Connor gave the
following historical account of parental liberty interests in childrearing:
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rather than a custody dispute, the role of due process would be plain
enough.15' Unlike parents facing termination, however, parents involved
in a custody dispute do not ordinarily risk total loss of parental rights, an
important distinction the Court has drawn in some termination cases.152
More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923),
we held that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes the
right of parents to "establish a home and bring up children" and "to control the
education of their own." Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925), we again held that the "liberty of parents and
guardians" includes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control." . . . . We returned to the subject in Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) .... .. It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder." Id. at 166.
' * * Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("It is plain that the
interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his
or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking
when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements' (citation omitted)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition"); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on numerous
occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally
protected"); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence
historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit
with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently
followed that course"); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)
(discussing "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child"); Glucksberg, supra, at 720 ("In a
long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due
Process Clause includes the righ[t] ... to direct the education and upbringing of
one's children" (citing Meyer and Pierce)).
530 U.S. at 65-66 (plurality opinion) (alterations in original).
151. See, e.g., M.L.B v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Santosky, 455 U.S. 645;
Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18.
152. See, e.g.,M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 121 ("In contrast to loss ofcustody, whichdoes
not sever the parent-child bond, parental status termination is 'irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]'
of the most fundamental family relationship." (alterations in original) (quoting Santosky, 455
U.S. at 753)); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39 ("A termination of parental rights is both total and
irrevocable. Unlike other custody proceedings, it leaves the parent with no right to visit or
communicate with the child, to participate in, or even to know about, any important decision
affecting the child's religious, educational, emotional, or physical development." (footnote
omitted)).
Dean Lombard has argued, however, that in the case of a young child, a noncustodial
parent who has a very limited visitation order may suffer a loss that "approaches
termination." Lombard, supra note 8, at 821. From the child's perspective, a custody order
may resemble a termination order in relation to the losing parent. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET
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Though not as dramatic as a termination of the parent-child relationship, a
loss of physical custody may occasion a substantial reduction of the
noncustodial parent's liberty interest in directing her children's upbringing,
overseeing their daily care, and determining with whom they associate.'53
In Troxel, a plurality of the Court stressed this parental associational
right to determine when and with whom children will spend their time,
finding constitutionally impermissible a grandparent visitation order to
which a parent objected.'54 The parental right to make associational
decisions is clearly at risk in traditional custody litigation, 5' for loss of
physical custody is fundamentally a loss of the right to determine not only
the extent of the child's contact with third persons, but, far more
significantly, the extent of contact with the noncustodial parent herself.
AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 40 (1973) (observing that a young child
"cannot stretch his waiting more than a few days without feeling overwhelmed by the
absence of parents"); Kandel, supra note 33, at 358 (observing that when the noncustodial
parent lives "in a different place . . . the child will have neither the money nor the
wherewithal to initiate phone conversations and long visits, to move or to select a school
close to the other parent, or to make other efforts to keep that parent involved").
153. See Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 1996) (observing that
noncustodial father's "liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of his son has
been substantially reduced by the terms of the divorce decree and Nebraska law"); see also
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 141-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the
majority's ruling that the State must fund a record on behalf of an indigent parent who
appeals termination of her parental rights will extend to other cases in which fundamental
rights appear to be at stake and citing a "custody determination" as an example of one such
case).
154. 530 U.S. at 66, 73 (holding that grandparent visitation order unconstitutionally
infringed parental decision-making). The Troxel story began with a visitation dispute
between the mother and grandparents of two children. Id. at 60-61. The grandparents
sought judicial intervention, invoking a Washington statute that authorized a court to order
nonparental visitation when, in the court's view, it served the best interests of the child. Id.
at 61. Apparently striking a compromise between mother and grandparents, the trial court
ordered grandparent visitation of "one weekend per month, one week during the summer,
and four hours on both of the petitioning grandparents' birthdays." Id. The unhappy
mother appealed and, ultimately, the Washington Supreme Court determined the visitation
statute unconstitutionally interfered with the mother's right to raise her children. In re
Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 31 (Wash. 1998), aff'd sub nom., Troxel, 530 U.S. 57. On
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, a plurality found the Washington statute unconstitutional
as applied. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75. In a heavily nuanced opinion, a plurality of the Court
found the Washington statute "breathtakingly broad," effectively allowing any third party to
subject a parent's visitation decision to state-court second-guessing, and according a parent's
wishes absolutely "no deference." Id. at 67. For helpful discussions of Troxel, see
generally Dolgin, supra note 119, and Gilles, supra note 126.
155. Traditional custody litigation engages a binary focus in which one parent (the
custodian) wins and the other parent (the noncustodian) loses the child's physical custody.
Even in less binary custody models, such as the one recently proposed by the ALl, one
parent ordinarily has primary responsibility for children's daily care, thus continuing in
practice the traditional custodian/noncustodian model. See Fineman, supra note 3, at 731-
34.
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Relegated to court-ordered visitation or the goodwill of the custodial
parent, the noncustodial parent's right to her child's companionship is
infringed, sometimes dramatically, sometimes hardly at all, but virtually
always. This is the peril posed by custody litigation, and it is substantial.
Although the noncustodial parent's loss may not be quantifiable, it is
unmistakable. Even when she retains the right to participate in important
decisions affecting the child, the noncustodial parent often loses the day-to-
day contact important to creating parent-child bonds. This lost opportunity
for the closeness that comes from daily intimate association is likely to be
irreversible in terms of relationship-building. 156 As Justice Blackburn once
observed, "[s]ome losses cannot be measured.""'
The Court has distinguished custody proceedings from termination
proceedings not only on the basis of totality, but also on the basis of
irreversibility.158 Although custody decisions are viewed as less permanent
than termination proceedings, and therefore less deserving of due process
protections,159 custody orders tend to be much more permanent in practice
than the language of modification statutes suggests. 60 As the ALI recently
observed, a custody decision is "expected to be final." 6' The essential
source of this finality is the belief that children benefit through continuity
156. See Lombard, supra note 8, at 823.
157. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 n. 11 (termination proceeding).
158. In other contexts, the Court has found that even a temporary deprivation may
violate procedural due process guarantees. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12
(1991) ("[O]ur cases show that even the temporary or partial impairments to property rights
... are sufficient to merit due process protection."); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 86 (1972) ("The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day
or 50-day deprivations of property.").
159. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 121 ("In contrast to loss of custody, which does not sever
the parent-child bond, parental status termination is 'irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]' of the most
fundamental family relationship." (alteration in original)) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at
753)); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39 ("A termination of parental rights is both total and
irrevocable." (emphasis added)).
160. The traditional standard for modification is a subsequent, unanticipated and
"substantial change in circumstance" that warrants a change in custody in order to ensure
the best interests of the child. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 704.
161. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 3. As the ALl explains, "relitigation is
considered a failure of adjudication and often is limited by a strict modification standard."
Id. The ALI acknowledges that in practice "courts are often reluctant to enforce a
dysfunctional custody order, notwithstanding the legal barriers to its modification." Id. at
4. The issue of course is the threshold requirement to establish a "dysfunctional" custody
arrangement, rather than the principle that children should be removed from dysfunctional
environments. If "dysfunctional" is very narrowly defined to extend, for example, only to
cases of physical abuse, custody orders will be final except in extraordinary cases. In its
proposed model, the ALI accords substantial deference to the child's preference, authorizing
modification to accommodate the firm and reasonable preference of a mature child. See
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.16(2)(c).
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in their environment. 162 Consequently, once the custodial parent has
established a home with the child, the noncustodial parent faces an
enormous burden in attempting to upset that environment.
Palmore v. Sidoti 63 provides a notorious example of the intractability
of the continuing norm. The Sidoti story began with a divorce decree
awarding custody of a three-year-old child to her mother. 164 The father
subsequently obtained a modification order, on the dubious ground that the
mother's cohabitation and later marriage to a man of another race was not
in the best interests of the child.' 65 The mother appealed, ultimately to the
Supreme Court, which reversed the trial court modification, finding its
racial basis constitutionally impermissible. 166 While jurisdictional issues
delayed a new custody hearing, the mother petitioned a Florida court to
order the child's return to her custody. 167 The court refused. 68 Seeking to
protect the child from "substantial upheavals of her life," and observing
that she had been living with her father for two and one-half years, the
court ordered the child to remain with her father pending a new hearing. 1
69
"A child custody suit," stated the court, "is not a game to be played for the
benefit of either parent."' 7° For the Sidoti mother, winning the
constitutional battle thus did not guarantee her victory in the custodial war.
Once lost, custody may be difficult indeed to regain, even when the initial
order was improper. The continuity norm, together with the practical
reality that some parents cannot afford to pursue an appeal or modification,
magnifies parents' stake in the initial custody outcome.
The parental claim to due process protections is not foreclosed by the
private nature of custody litigation. While the classic procedural due
process case involves a State action against an individual who seeks
procedural protections against the State,' 7 ' the Court has applied due
162. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 704 (noting the "widely held view that a
child's interest is best served by stable custody orders"); see, e.g., MICH. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. § 722.23(d) (listing among the factors relevant to custody, "[tlhe length of time the
child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining
continuity"); id. § 722.27(1)(c) ("[Clourt shall not modify or amend its previous judgments
or orders or issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a
child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of
the child.").
163. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
164. Id. at 430.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 433-34.
167. Palmore v. Sidoti, 472 So. 2d 843, 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 847.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (defendant seeks evidentiary hearing prior to
termination of social security benefits); Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18 (indigent mother seeks
counsel in proceeding for termination of parental rights).
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process requirements to a paternity dispute between private parties. In that
case, Little v. Streater,172 the Court emphasized, however, that the
pervasive State involvement in the case distinguished it from "a common
dispute between private parties. "173 Since custody litigation is inherently a
private dispute, parental due process protections may thus depend on the
extent of State involvement in the case. This involvement is pervasive
indeed. Stepping into the litigation in its parens patriae capacity, the State
searches out the child's best interests, undeterred by norms of family
privacy, and engaging the child in a private conversation from which
parents are excluded. Indeed, the gravamen of parents' due process
complaint is that the State has gone too far in its engagement, unfairly
apprizing itself of information in-camera which it refuses to disclose.
Under these circumstances, the private origin of the custody dispute makes
procedural protections no less imperative.174
In sum, custody litigation imperils parents' fundamental right to enjoy
their children's companionship and to direct their children's upbringing.
This peril is magnified by the difficulty of regaining physical custody once
lost. The great weight of the parental liberty interest, together with the
significant deprivation of that interest inherent in a loss of physical
custody, entitles parents to custody procedures that meet the requisites of
due process.
B. What Fairness Requires
"'[D]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content," s but rather a flexible phrase that "calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." 176
Due process essentially "expresses the requirement of 'fundamental
fairness, ' , 177 which entitles parties risking deprivation of fundamental
172. 452 U.S. 1 (1981). Little involved an indigent mother's state-compelled
paternity action against an indigent defendant who claimed a right to a state-funded blood
test. Id. at 3. Applying Eldridge, the Court determined that the state's refusal to fund the
test violated procedural due process. Little, 452 U.S. at 16.
173. Id. at 9.
174. At least one state court has subjected in-camera custody interviews to due
process scrutiny. See generally Molloy, 637 N.W.2d at 806-09 (applying Eldridge to
determine legitimacy of confidential in-camera custody interview). For a discussion of
Molloy, see infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
175. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
(citation omitted). See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.1, at 3 (3d ed. 1999).
176. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
177. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24.
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liberty interests to an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner." 178
Whether fundamental fairness entitles parents to an opportunity to
challenge their children's in-camera statements depends on the Supreme
Court's test of procedural due process, set out in Mathews v. Eldridge. '79
This test requires a balancing of three factors: (1) "the private interest that
will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail"; and
(3) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards."80
1. THE PRIVATE INTEREST AT STAKE
Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in "the companionship,
care, custody and management" of their children.' 8 ' In Troxel, a plurality
of the Court recently signaled the significance and breadth of this parental
interest by recognizing that it may be impermissibly infringed by a
grandparent visitation order to which a parent objects.'82 The Court's
statement that a parent's right to determine third party visitation is a
significant-enough aspect of parental rights to trigger constitutional
protection suggests the gravity of a noncustodial parent's loss.'83 If the loss
of power to determine grandparent visitation is constitutionally significant,
how much more so is a parent's lost power to control her children's
upbringing and to determine the extent of her companionship with them.
The noncustodial parent's loss is significant indeed.
Although both parents risk a substantial reduction of their parental
rights, neither parent's rights can determine the custody outcome, for when
two fit parents compete for custody, both parents assert Troxel-parent
rights.' 4 Because each parent's interest is the legal equivalent of the other
178. See Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552; see also Little, 452 U.S. at 5-6 ("[P]ersons
forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971)).
179. 424 U.S. at 335.
180. Id.
181. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758; see supra Part II.A.
182. 530 U.S. at 72. Although Troxel was a substantive due process case, its
significance to a procedural due process issue lies in its reaffirmation of the importance of
the parental interest and in its recognition that this interest protects a parent's right to
control her child's contact with third parties. Id. at 67.
183. Id.
184. For this notion of Troxel-parent status, I am indebted to my colleague Mae
Kuykendall, Professor of Law, Michigan State University, DCL College of Law.
150
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parent's interest, each interest offsets the other, leaving only the child's
interest to determine custody. 185 Neither parent can thus claim a right to
custody that is not in the child's best interests, a conclusion that is
consistent with the normative principle that good and noble parents seek
the best interests of their children, even at great cost to themselves.1
86
During litigation, each parent thus has an interest in a custody decision that
protects her parental rights, reducing those rights only to the extent
necessary to ensure her child's best interests. 1 7 Because parents' rights
thus depend on a determination of the child's best interests, parents have a
commanding interest in ensuring the "accuracy and justice" of that
determination, 188 an interest that is not served when a judge bases custody
on children's unverified and likely untrustworthy statements. 189
2. THE STATE'S INTEREST
Under the Eldridge due-process equation, the parental interest in
accessing in-camera statements must be balanced against the State's
countervailing interest.' 90 The State's general interest in custody litigation
is twofold. First, the State seeks fiscal and administrative efficiency,' 9 '
aiming to make custody decisions as economically as possible and to avoid
any unnecessary expense. In the case of in-camera interviews, the fiscal
185. See Andersen, supra note 26, at 937, 951; see also In re Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227, 1256 (N.J. 1988) ("[Because] the claims of the natural father and the natural mother
are entitled to equal weight ... the child's best interests determine custody." (footnote
omitted)).
186. The Troxel Court's deference to parental decision-making was grounded in the
long-standing presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their children.
"'Natural bonds of affection,"' said the Court, "'lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children.'" Id. (quoting Parham, 442 U.S. at 602). During custody litigation,
however, parents may not actually have their children's best-interests at heart. See supra
Part I.B. 1.a.
187. Professor Kandel has argued, however, that neither children nor their parents
have an independent constitutional right to a best-interests custody decision, "although the
goal of granting custody in the best interests of the child is a substantial government
interest." Kandel, supra note 33, at 349, 351.
188. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (recognizing "[a] parent's interest in the accuracy
and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status").
189. See Lombard, supra note 8, at 817 (reporting "a substantial probability that
judges receive inaccurate information" during in-camera interviews, based on a survey of
Michigan judges).
190. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
191. The State's interest in efficiency is a standard part of the Eldridge balancing
test. Id. at 348 ("At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual
affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the
action is just, may be outweighed by the cost."); see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28 (noting
the State's pecuniary interest in parental termination proceedings); Little, 452 U.S. at 14
(noting the State's "financial concerns").
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and administrative costs of procedural safeguards are likely to be
insubstantial. Providing parents with a videotape of the interview, for
example, would be relatively inexpensive, especially in view of the brevity
of the typical in-camera conversation.192 The State's pecuniary interest is
therefore weak.
The State has a much more weighty "parens patriae interest in
preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,"' 93 who is profoundly
affected'94 by the disintegration of her family and in great need of the
State's protection. 95 The State's parens patriae mission is twofold: (1)
guard the child's ultimate well-being by ensuring the accuracy and justice
of the best-interests determination; and (2) shield the child, as much as
possible, from the immediate trauma of custodial battle. 196
While parents may in principle share the State's concern for the
child's best-interests,' 97 in practice parents' best-interests motivation may
be compromised "by feelings of loss, anxiety, guilt and anger"' 9s during
the custody conflict that lead them to prioritize their own interests over the
interests of their children. Because parents fighting for custody do not
192. For a review of additional safeguards protecting parents, see infra Part II.B.3.
193. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766; see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 47 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (observing that State has "a legitimate interest in promoting the physical and
emotional well-being of its minor children").
194. See GOULD, supra note 5, at 3 ("[Children's] lives are profoundly altered by
the anger, disappointment, and failure that characterizes their parents' marital
breakdown. ").
195. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02 cmt. b ("[W]hen a family breaks up,
children are usually the most vulnerable parties and thus most in need of the law's
protection. ").
196. The State's responsibility to children caught up in custody battles is rooted in a
counterpoint of traditional notions of childhood as a protected status, and more
contemporary notions of children as individuals with increasing autonomy. See supra Part
I.A.
197. Actually, the best-interests custody model inherently assumes the contrary, that
is, that one of the parents is not actually the child's "best" custodian and is therefore not
acting in the child's best interests in demanding custody, an assumption averted only in joint
custody outcomes. For a view that there is actually no "best" custodian and therefore no
"right" answer to the custody question in disputes between two fit parents, see generally
Elster, supra note 2, at 12-16. For a brief critique of the best-interests model, see infra
Part III.
198. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b. As the ALI explains:
[E]xpectations and preferences are often complicated at divorce by feelings of
loss, anxiety, guilt, and anger-feelings that tend not only to cloud a parent's
judgment and ability to make decisions on behalf of the child, but also to
exaggerate the amount of responsibility a parent wants to assume for a child, or
the objections he or she has to the other parent's level of involvement in the
child's life.
Id. For a discussion of the efforts of parents to manipulate their children in order to win the
custody battle, see supra Part I.B. 1.b.(i).
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reliably seek their children's best interests, the State's assertion of those
interests on behalf of the child is critical.'9 9
While the State's intervention on behalf of the child is essential, it may
not be sufficient, for the State's concern for the child is not as strong or as
exclusive as the child's interest in herself. Because the State's interests are
plural and diverse, its interest in the well-being of a particular child may be
overridden by other important interests.2"' To take a simple example, an
individual child might benefit significantly from long-term, state-funded
counseling, which the State deems too costly in view of the huge number
of children of divorce, and the more acute needs of other children who
perhaps have suffered physical abuse. Although there will usually be no
dramatic substantive clash between the interests of the child and those of
the State, the State cannot fully represent the child's interest. It is essential
therefore that the State empower children to speak for themselves.2"'
Giving children a voice in the vital issue of their custody furthers
norms of fundamental fairness, 2 and also enhances the information
gathering necessary to best-interests decision-making. Children may be
valuable sources of information not otherwise available, and their
conversation may alert a judge to important issues that require further
exploration. Obtaining a first-hand account of the child's perspectives,
voluntary preferences, and other information she considers important may
contribute significantly to a determination of what is best for her. Giving
children an opportunity to speak in their own voice thus furthers the State's
interest in an accurate and just custody decision, a goal shared by parents
and by the child herself.
199. A good argument can be made that the child's interest ought to be considered
as a separate private interest in family disputes. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 86 (Stevens,
J., dissenting):
Cases like this [visitation dispute] do not present a bipolar struggle between the
parents and the State over who has final authority to determine what is in a
child's best interests. There is at a minimum a third individual, whose interests
are implicated in every case to which the [grandparent visitation] statutes
applies-the child.
To include the child's interest as a separate private interest in the Eldridge due process
equation, however, would transform this simple balancing test into a much less orderly,
multivariate test, requiring a balancing of each private interest against the State's interest
and also against the interest of the other private party. In an effort to preserve the powerful
simplicity of Eldridge without harming the vitally significant interests of the child, this
Article includes the child's interest within the State's parens patriae interest.
200. For this point I am indebted to Professor R. George Wright, Professor of Law,
Indiana University-Indianapolis School of Law.
201. As previously discussed, the child's interest in speaking freely is not
synonymous with an interest in controlling the custody outcome, which some children will
experience as burdensome rather than empowering. See supra Part I.B. L.a.
202. See supra Part I.B.2.
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Some children, who are able and willing to speak openly, require only
that someone listen. For other children, however, the ability to speak
depends on the availability of a safe environment, far removed from the
traumatic atmosphere of the court room.2"3 In-camera interviews attempt to
offer children this safe haven and thus to further the State's interest in
shielding children, as much as possible, from the custody conflict.2"
The State's interest in sheltering children from immediate trauma,
however, conflicts with parents' interest in an opportunity to challenge the
accuracy and reasonableness of their children's in-camera statements.
Indeed, the State's interest in protecting children's immediate well-being
conflicts with the State's additional interest in children's ultimate well-
being, since untested information obtained in-camera may inspire an
erroneous determination of the child's best interests." 5 Partial escape from
this conundrum requires adoption safeguards that reduce the risk of
erroneous factfinding at the least possible cost to children's immediate
well-being.
3. PROCEDURE RELIABILITY
The final factor in the Eldridge due-process equation is "the fairness
and reliability of the existing . . . procedures, and the probable value, if
any, of additional procedural safeguards."2 6 Procedural due process
requirements "are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding
process. "207 As previously discussed, in-camera interviews are not reliable
203. While the proposition that children should have a voice in their custody
suggests a view of children as autonomous individuals, the concern that children not be
subjected to open testimony suggests a view of children as members of a protected status.
As children's socio-cognitive development progresses, the balance between these two views
of childhood alters, so that the state's urgent interest in protecting very young children from
the process trauma of open testimony is much diminished in cases of adolescents, who are
thought to be less needful of parens patriae protection and better able to assert their rights as
autonomous players.
204. For a discussion of process costs that even the State's best efforts cannot
eliminate, see supra Part I.B. I.a.
205. The sometimes competing State interest in protecting children and in ensuring
accurate fact-finding in the context of child protection proceedings is helpfully portrayed by
the Supreme Court of Michigan:
Although the fiscal or administrative burden of allowing respondents' counsel to
cross-examine the child may be slight, the governmental interest in protecting
her from trauma is significant. Furthermore, the state's interest in protecting
the child is impeded by error in the factfinding process. Therefore, the
procedure designed by the probate court to secure the most accurate testimony
furthers the governmental interest in protecting the welfare of the child.
In re Brock, 499 N.W.2d 752, 758 (Mich. 1993).
206. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343.
207. Id. at 344.
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fact-finding tools, since children are apt to convey inaccurate information
and to state unreasonable preferences.2"' If the interview is kept
confidential and the judge relies on the child's statements, the risk of an
erroneous custody decision is substantial. States have experimented with a
variety of procedures to reduce this risk of error: (1) requiring a record of
the interview; (2) allowing counsel to attend the interview; (3) enlisting
experts to conduct the interview; and (4) limiting the scope of the
interview. The probable value of each of these safeguards is considered
here.209
a. Requiring a Record
The practice in most states is to require a record of the in-camera
interview.210  The form of this record may vary from a videotape,
audiotape, or transcript, to a judicial summary.21 While the fiscal cost of a
record is likely to be insubstantial, given the brevity of the typical
interview,21 2 its efficacy in ensuring accurate fact-finding depends on its
accessibility to would-be challengers. What is the judge to do with the
record? Release it to parents? To parents' counsel, perhaps with an
instruction not to share it with parents? Should the record be made
208. See supra Part I.B.l.b.
209. For an overview of analogous cases involving attempts to shield child
witnesses from defendants in criminal abuse cases, see generally, Marsil et al., supra note
44 (discussing various procedures including "placing a screen between child witnesses and
the defendant during testimony; transmitting children's testimony into courtroom by closed-
circuit television; and admitting children's . . . videotaped interviews" into evidence
(citations omitted)).
210. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.14 cmt. a. In some states, a written record
is statutorily required. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-126(1) (West 1997 &
Supp. 2002); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/604(a) (West 1999); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
403.290(1) (Michie 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.385 (West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §
40-4-214 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 594(c) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.10.120 (West 1997). In some states a written record depends on a party's request. See,
e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1614 (Supp. 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 113(C) (West
2001 & Supp. 2003); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153,009(d) (Vernon 2002).
211. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.14 cmt. a; see also Molloy, 637
N.W.2d at 811 (requiring a record, but leaving "[tihe manner of recordation of the
interview, e.g. stenographic, tape, or video ... to the discretion of the trial judge"). This
part of the Molloy opinion was vacated by the Supreme Court of Michigan. Molloy, 643
N.W.2d at 574. In an earlier draft of the Principles, the ALI noted by way of comment that
a written summary of the interview would not satisfy a record requirement since "it leaves
too much room for misinterpretation and error." PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.16 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 3
1998) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES DRAFT No. 3]. This provision, along with a record
requirement, was deleted from the ALI's final draft. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, §
2.14.
212. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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available during the proceedings or only on appeal? Should only the
appellate court have access? Unfortunately, the ALI offers no guidance on
these questions, having deleted from its final draft of the Principles an
earlier recommendation that a record be made of the interview but kept
confidential except for purposes of appeal. 213
The difficulty of a record requirement is that, even as it promotes
truthfinding by exposing children's statements to parental challenge, it
compromises the child's privacy and perhaps her ability to speak freely.
If, for example, parents were given a videotape of an in-camera
conversation during custody proceedings, they would gain a valuable
opportunity to mold their arguments in response, challenging the accuracy
of their child's statements of fact and the reasonableness of her preference.
Since parents are singularly well-positioned to shed light on the intimacies
of family life and therefore on the child's perspectives, this parental
opportunity would tend to enhance truth-finding. From the child's
perspective, however, this enhanced truth-finding would exact a huge
price. Drawn deeper into the custody war, children would be the target of
parents who are angry, hurt, and threatened by their statements. In effect,
releasing a record to parents places children on a virtual witness stand,
exposed to the very trauma in-camera interviews are designed to protect
against.2"4 Especially for children who are coaxed in camera to express a
preference they have not publicly stated, parental access to children's'
private statements can increase process costs for children and leave them
with an enormous sense of responsibility, guilt, and regret.2"'
For some children, the prospect of parental access to their statements
will chill their ability to speak freely. Assuming fair play requires a trial
213. See ALI PRINCIPLES DRAFT No. 3, supra note 211, § 2.16 ("A transcript,
videotape, or other reliable means of recording the complete interview shall be made part of
the record of the proceedings, and should be confidential except for purposes of appeal of
the court's order."). In its adopted version, the ALI acknowledges, in a comment, that
"[t]he practice in most jurisdictions is to require a ... record[]," although the Institute
takes no position on the soundness of this practice. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, §
2.14 & cmt. a.
214. As one court explained its decision to decline to impose a record requirement,
"the potential for misuse of the recorded statement, which was given in confidence by a
distraught child, far outweighs any possible benefit to the parent's right to appeal."
Lesauskis v. Lesauskis, 314 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). Professor Jones
agrees. See Jones, supra note 61, at 81 (arguing that requiring a record deprives children of
"freedom and privacy to tell the judge anything he or she wishes without fear that the child's
parents will learn what the child has said and consequently reject or punish him or her").
215. For a discussion of these and other outcome costs, see supra Part I.B. 1.c.
Dean Lombard suggests, however, that in some cases, children may be as burdened by
secrecy as much as by disclosure. Lombard, supra note 8, at 834. "A six to ten year old
child," she reasons, "might feel overwhelmed at the burden of keeping the awful secret that
she revealed to the judge-that she preferred one parent to the other." Id.
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judge to inform children that their conversation will be recorded," 6 some
children so informed will choose not to speak at all, or to speak only
guardedly. 2 7 The result may be a distorted, less compelling version of the
child's voice, and a loss of valuable information and perspectives relevant
to the child's best interests that are not elsewhere available.21 8
As an alternative to a full record, the judge might disclose to parents
only the questions she intends to ask, but keep the child's responses
confidential.219 While this option superficially appears to protect children,
it would in practice subject them to significant costs as parents press
children for answers withheld by the court. Once again, children would be
thrust into the center of the custody war zone.
Perhaps children could be better protected if the record were made
available only on appeal, and then only to the appellate court. While this
restriction would go far in protecting children from process stress, it would
offer little protection to parents, who would have no opportunity to
challenge, explain, or contextualize the child's statements. Accuracy
testing would thus depend not on the child's parents, who are well-
positioned to spot error, but on appellate judges, who are far removed
from the child.22° Moreover, the appellate court's invitation to assess the
trustworthiness of the child's statements depends on the parents' ability to
fund an appeal, an expensive proposition that parents may simply be
unable to afford. Parents unable or unwilling to await appellate
intervention would be sorely tempted to coax information about the
interview from the child, a possibility that less formally but just as
decidedly thrusts the child onto the virtual witness stand.
Seeking to reduce the risk of an erroneous decision while protecting
children's immediate welfare, a Michigan court recently struck a three-part
compromise: (1) require a record of the in-camera interview;221 (2) make
216. See Jones, supra note 61, at 81 (arguing that the child's privacy and the
integrity of the judicial process mandate that the judge inform the child, prior to their
conversation, that the interview will be recorded). Professor Jones suggests that the child be
given an opportunity to object to the recording and decline the interview or decline to
answer particular questions. Id.
217. But see Lombard, supra note 8, at 835 (observing that this possibility is
"difficult to evaluate" and that the impact of a recording may vary with the age of the
child).
218. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.14 cmt. b ("[T]he child may have a useful
perspective on such matters that others cannot provide.").
219. Jones, supra note 61, at 80; see also infra Part II.B.3.b. (discussing the
comparable option of allowing parties or their counsel to submit questions to the judge).
220. Professor Jones warns that while this option initially seems attractive, it rests
on the dubious assumption that appellate judges are more capable of evaluating the child's
interview, even at arm's length, than the trial judge. Jones, supra note 61, at 83-84. She
ultimately concludes that the costs of a record outweigh the benefits and opposes a record
requirement. Id. at 84.
221. Molloy, 637 N.W.2d at 810.
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the record available to an appellate court;2. and (3) allow parties access to
information in addition to preference that "affects the custody decision.",
2 3
The third prong of this test, of course, is the 800-pound gorilla. Since
children frequently volunteer information during in-camera interviews,224
Michigan judges who privately interview children will frequently be
required to determine whether any of the child's statements in addition to
preference might affect or will affect the custody decision. 25 This is no
easy task, given the open-ended statutory laundry list of factors relevant to
custody and the court's broad discretion to determine what is "best." The
conscientious judge will carefully consider the possibility that the child's
statements have influenced her while striving to protect the child's
confidence whenever possible, a process that adds new administrative
burdens to an already burdensome task. The more risk-averse judge will
simply make the record available to parents in all cases, except the
virtually inconceivable ones in which none of the child's statements could
possibly affect the custody decision. While the Michigan court's struggle
to balance the interests of parents and children is laudable, in practice it
may simply be a disguised open-record requirement.
In sum, while a record requirement offers significant safeguards
against fact-finding errors, it significantly compromises the child's
immediate well-being. However, given the peril to both parents and
children posed by a custody decision based on erroneous fact-finding,
Eldridge favors some form of record requirement unless an alternative
222. Id. The court did not specify to whom the record should be made available on
appeal, stating only that such a record "is necessary for purposes of meaningful appellate
review and to ensure the integrity of the custody decisions." Id.
223. Id. at 811. Curiously, the court stated this critical test for parental access to
the record in three different ways: (1) "We also require that the record . . . be made
available ... if the interview affects an additional child custody factor and that information
makes a difference in the outcome of the case." Id. at 805 (suggesting the entire record be
made available if information had an actual impact on the custody outcome); (2) "when
information affecting another best interest factor . . . is obtained in an in camera meeting
with the judge and may affect the court's decision, a copy of the record must be made
available to the parties so that the parties are afforded an opportunity to refute or challenge
the veracity of the information obtained." Id. at 810-11 (suggesting the entire record must
be made available if information has a potential impact on the custody outcome); and (3) "if
the information provided in the in camera setting does exceed the scope of preference to the
extent that it affects the custody decision, then the trial court must permit parties access to
the record and the opportunity to be heard." Id. at 811 (suggesting only the relevant portion
of the record must be made available if information had an actual impact on the custody
outcome).
224. See id. at 808 ("[I]n the process of determining a child's preference a judge
frequently learns additional information that could influence the decision-making process.").
225. The Molloy opinion suggests both of these tests in different parts of its opinion.
See supra note 223.
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safeguard can protect against error at less cost to the child's immediate
well-being.
b. Including Counsel
Some states require a court to permit counsel to attend the in-camera
interview.226 Including attorneys in the interview gives parents indirect
access to the child's significant statements, thereby allowing parents an
opportunity to challenge or otherwise limit the impact of those statements.
The administrative costs to the State of such a safeguard would be minimal,
requiring notification and incidental accommodations to attorneys.
The presence of counsel, however, might have a chilling effect on the
child's ability to speak freely to the judge.227 Lombard reported that most
judges in her survey declined to include attorneys in the interview out of
concern that the child would respond to the increased formality "by
refusing to reveal anything to the judge that she did not wish her parents to
know." 22' Especially for judges inclined toward casual courthouse-step
conversations with children, inclusion of counsel would transform the
nature of the conversation, discomforting both child and judge, and
compromising its usefulness in eliciting valuable information.
In an apparent attempt to balance concern for the child's interest with
the parental interest in access to information, some states allow counsel to
observe the interview, but prohibit their participation,229 evidently on an
assumption that the silent attorney is less intimidating to the child than the
vocal one. The impact of the scary attorney might also be reduced by a
judicial instruction, delivered in the presence of the child, that the attorney
not share with parents information obtained during the interview.23°
226. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/604(a) (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.385 (West 1997).
227. See Jones, supra note 61, at 79 ("[I]n the presence of strangers the child may
be less likely ... to talk honestly and openly with a judge.").
228. Lombard, supra note 8, at 813. In the words of one judge, if you allow
attorneys "you might just as well put the kid on the stand." Id. Lombard found, however,
that the presence of a court reporter did not appear to stifle the in-camera conversation. Id.
at 825.
229. See Scott et al., supra note 30, at 1058-59 (reporting that while some Virginia
judges allowed attorneys to attend the interview, few permitted parents' attorneys to take an
active role). In an even more restricted version of the counsel option, attorneys might be
permitted to watch the interview through a one-way window. See, e.g., In re Brock, 499
N.W.2d at 758 (methodology in child protective proceeding). To the extent judicial
integrity requires the court to inform the child of this one-way mirror, the effect on the child
would be similar to that of visible third parties and to a record, for the critical question for
the child is whether Mom and Dad will know what she says, rather than how they will
know.
230. For this insight I am indebted to Joan E. Young, Chief Circuit Judge, Oakland
County Sixth Circuit Court, Michigan.
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Assuming the already-insecure child believed the attorney would honor the
judge's instruction, the child's perception of risk might thereby be reduced,
although the fact of the instruction itself might signal the gravity of the
interview to a child who did not previously comprehend it and therefore
tend to increase rather than decrease her stress and thus her willingness to
speak.
Another variation of the counsel option would exclude attorneys from
the interview, but allow them to submit questions for the court to ask
during the interview. This measure would seem to give parents some
control over the information judges obtain from the child without
compromising the child's sense of safety. Although the ALl has endorsed
this option,"' it may not be as innocuous as it initially appears. The
potential for parental mischief is unmistakable as parents discover an
opportunity to use children as conduits of strategic information they are
coached to recite.232 "Tell me about your trip to Reno with Daddy," reads
the trial court's cue card. What follows is a child's well-rehearsed
narrative of Dad's gambling, drinking, and cavorting, all carefully scripted
by Mom. While the story may or may not be credible, the dad who is
unaware of it cannot challenge it. Unfortunately, the attractiveness of this
opportunity to use children as pawns may prove too tempting for some
parents to resist.
c. Deferring to Experts
The ALI authorizes judges who feel "uncomfortable" interviewing
children to delegate the interview task to someone else.233 If this delegate
is a social worker or other experienced child-care worker, her skill may
231. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.14 ("Counsel for a parent or for the child
should be permitted to propose questions to the court that may be asked of the child.").
232. For this insight I am indebted to Joan E. Young, Chief Circuit Judge, Oakland
County Sixth Circuit Court, Michigan. In the analogous setting of custody mediation,
Robert Emery reports widespread parental coaching:
Perhaps because of their high-conflict disputes, or because of their experience
with the legal system, many parents coach their children in advance about what
to say. I often learned this from the children themselves, who naively told me
that they were telling me what their parents told them to tell me.
Emery, supra note 49, at 166-67.
233. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.14 cmt. b. Such a third party might be
a child psychologist, social worker, or other experienced child-care worker. The ALI
broadly authorizes the court to "appoint an investigator, evaluator, or guardian ad litem to
interview the child and report to the court." See also id. § 2.13 (authorizing court-ordered
investigation). Dean Lombard reports that "seventy-three percent [of judges surveyed]
recommended that other experts do the interviewing, either in addition to or in lieu of the
judges." Lombard, supra note 8, at 816.
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produce better interview results, that is, more reliable information at less
cost to children. At least that's the theory.
In practice, as Professor Fineman has observed, "social workers are
not neutral" and may inject a professional bias into the interview that
disadvantages mothers.234  Allowing experts to replace judges might
further impede fact-finding by foreclosing judges from an opportunity to
direct the interview toward factors legally relevant to custody.235 Judges
would acquire information second hand,236 losing the opportunity to
respond interactively to the child's statements and demeanor. Interjection
of experts into the dispute may also exacerbate the parties' hostilities,
compromising the success of post-divorce custody arrangements.237
Moreover, even when an expert succeeds in producing more accurate
information than a judge, that information will not be free of information
risks, and therefore must undergo some form of accuracy testing.238 On
balance, the expert-interviewer option may simply compound the fiscal
costs of conversations with the child 239 without eliminating the need for
subsequent accuracy testing.
In a variant of the expert-interviewer option, judges might themselves
be trained in cognitive development theory in order to better equip them to
gauge the child's maturity 2 ° and the accuracy and reasonableness of her
234. Fineman, supra note 3, at 730.
235. See Jones, supra note 61, at 73.
236. Use of an expert as a middle-person between child and judge also invites
communication errors, although allowing judges to view a videotape of the interview would
reduce these communication costs. See Jones, supra note 61, at 73.
237. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b ("Avoiding expert testimony
is desirable because such testimony, within an adversarial context, tends to focus on the
weaknesses of each parent and thus undermines the spirit of cooperation and compromise
necessary to successful post-custody arrangements ....").
238. Dean Lombard would require the expert to file a report with the court, which
would be made available to the parents who would then have an "opportunity to cross-
examine the expert." Lombard, supra note 8, at 840-41.
239. In a worst-case scenario, the parent who discovers a child has made statements
unfavorable to her custody claim would hire a new expert to conduct a "more skillful"
interview designed to produce "better" answers, at, of course, additional cost. See id. at
842. "Success" in this subsequent expert interview would then tempt the other parent to
initiate yet another expert interview, a response repeated until the judge calls a time-out to
protect the child from subsequent interviews. See id. This scenario of course assumes the
parental resources necessary to bear the costs of expert interviews; if parents are disparately
positioned, so that only one parent has access to subsequent experts, the other parent may be
at an unfair strategic disadvantage.
240. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 61, at 72-73 (arguing that judges should have "at
least a basic knowledge of child development principles" to enable them to know "what
questions to ask in eliciting the needed information, how to ask those questions in order to
receive accurate answers, and how to interpret the child's responses"); Mlyniec, supra note
76, at 1906-08 (urging such training for family-court judges, but concluding that preference
should not be determinative unless a third party interviews the child).
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statements. Some limited judicial training is no doubt prudent. But the
kind of extensive training necessary to equip judges with expert interview
skills would impose significant fiscal and administrative costs on the State
with no guarantee that judges would thereafter reliably eliminate
information risks or the need for subsequent testing of the child's
statements.
d. Limiting the Scope of the Interview
A final safeguard that might protect parental rights without
compromising the child's ability to speak would limit the scope of the in-
camera interview, authorizing the judge to inquire only into the child's
preference and nothing more.24" ' The simple underlying theory is that if
less information is obtained, there is less opportunity for untrustworthy
information to affect the custody outcome.
The problem with this approach, however, is that it won't work.
Indeed, as the Michigan court adopting this limitation observed, "in the
process of determining a child's preference a judge frequently learns
additional information that could influence the decision-making process. '242
The court's effort to determine whether the child's preference is
reasonable, together with the advisability of indirect rather than direct
questions243 ensures that most in-camera interviews will produce
information in addition to preference even when the judge is not seeking it.
Moreover, a judge's attempt to prevent children from discussing
information in addition to preference that they consider important signals
an unwillingness to listen and a disrespect for the child that may undermine
her sense of value and satisfaction with the legal system. In addition to
these costs to the child's sense of significance, the scope limitation is
inherently unwise, since success in gagging the child may deprive the court
of important information. On balance, a scope limitation is unworkable,
disrespectful, and imprudent.
4. ON BALANCE
The fundamental parental right to the care and companionship of
children, reaffirmed in Troxel, gives parents a commanding interest in
ensuring the accuracy and justice of the custody decision. Given the
substantial risk that children's in-camera statements will be inaccurate and
241. See Molloy, 637 N.W.2d at 808 (requiring that an in-camera "interview[] be
limited to reasonable questions to discover the preference of the child").
242. Id.
243. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f ("Generally speaking, the
preferences of a child, even when relevant, should not be directly solicited.").
162
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unreasonable, fundamental fairness requires that parents be given an
opportunity to challenge the child's statements that may lead a court to
erroneously deny a parent's claim to physical custody. "[F]airness," as
Justice Frankfurter observed, "can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided
determination of facts decisive of rights."2 44 The Eldridge balancing test
thus favors providing parents with a record of the in-camera interview and
allowing them an opportunity during the proceedings to challenge their
children's statements. While this process would reduce the risk of
erroneous decision-making, to the benefit of both parents and children, it
would increase process and outcome risks for children, compromising the
safety of the judge's chambers and subjecting children to reprisal from
parents who are angered, threatened, or disappointed by their children's
statements.
If the child's statements must be revealed to parents, as Eldridge
suggests, it is imperative that the in-camera interview be restructured to
decrease the risks to the child of such exposure. Children thus should not
be asked, directly or indirectly, to express a preference that they have not
previously and openly acknowledged, and they should never be coaxed into
more extensive involvement in the custody battle than they might like
through forced-choice questions, designed to flush out a preference that
may not reliably exist apart from the child's eagerness to please the judge
who presupposes the child has a preference. Rather, children should be
given an opportunity for free narrative, allowing them to speak broadly to
any issue they consider important, or not to speak at all. Nor should any
preference the child chooses to express be given dispositive effect, since
abdicating control of the custody decision to the child can burden her with
an onerous sense of responsibility, guilt, and regret. Escape from the
perils of preference-driven decision-making, however, may require retreat
from the best-interests custody model that inspired it.
III. FROM THE MOUTHS OF BABES
I like children, -he said to me one day at table, -I like 'em and I
respect 'em. Pretty much all the honest truth-telling there is in
the world is done by them.245
The law's preoccupation with preference has muted children's voices.
Judges searching out unexpressed preferences or struggling to verify the
maturity and reasonableness of expressed preferences have less time to
244. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
245. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Poet at the Breakfast Table, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Feb. 1872, at 231.
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listen to the things children think are important. This lost opportunity is
significant, both for children who lose the freedom to speak to issues that
concern them, and to legal actors who lose access to valuable sources of
information and perspectives that others cannot provide. "Whom do you
love most?" is the wrong question to ask children. The wise judge will
instead ask, "Is there anything you want me to know?"
Given an opportunity for free narrative, some children will choose to
talk about their hamsters, and some children will choose to say nothing.
But other children will reveal unsuspected perspectives, critical instances
of parental devotion, mistreatment, or even abuse. Other children will
open doors leading to important information that would otherwise remain
undisclosed. And some children will volunteer a strongly-held custodial
preference. The point is that we do not know what children will say. If
we do not invite children to speak, we may never know. 4'
The imprudent practice of devoting in-camera conversations to
preference is less a product of uncaring judges than it is a pragmatic
response to the inadequacies of the best-interests model.247 Using the
246. Some children of course will blurt out information unrelated to custodial
preference despite the judge's efforts to confine their conversation. These children, like
more restrained children, however, deserve an invitation to speak broadly and may speak
more extensively if so invited.
247. The best-interests custody model has long been criticized for its indeterminacy
and unpredictability. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 3, at 727; Mary Anne Glendon, Fixed
Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV.
1165, 1181 (1986); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in
the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 262 (1975). As the ALI
recently observed, the best-interests test "tells courts what is best for a child, as if what is
best could be determined and was within their power to achieve." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra
note 3, at 2. Jonathon Gould describes the difficulty of this judicial task:
[J]udges, who are motivated by their sincere and passionate concern for social
order and responsibility, are asked to render judgement about the best interests
of the child despite not knowing the child. Theirs is the supreme balancing act,
listening for information and relevant facts within a sea of game-playing,
positioning and accumulation of irrelevant facts made to look important.
GOULD, supra note 5, at 4.
The best-interests standard has also been criticized for its tendency to generate costly
and protracted litigation. See, e.g., Mnookin, supra, at 262. Incentives for strategic
procrastination are built into custody litigation, as the parent with greater resources seeks
delay in order to strike a more favorable settlement and the parent with temporary custody
seeks delay in order to establish a stable environment with the child that will strengthen her
custody claim. See Elster, supra note 2, at 23-24. Unfortunately, protracted litigation
imposes tremendous emotional costs on children, who continue their painful role as
"mediator, weapon, pawn, bargaining chip, trophy, go-between or even spy." Id. at 24.
The best-interests standard has been further criticized for its tendency to inspire judges
to rely on personal moral codes. See id. § 2.02 cmt. c ("When the only guidance for the
court is what best serves the child's interests, the court must rely on its own values
judgments .... ); BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 22, at 42 (observing that lack of guidance
leads courts to rely on their "upbringing, biases, and, perhaps, irrationalities ... [which is]
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child's preference as a proxy for her best interests has eased the daunting
judicial task of assessing what is "best" for a particular child. 24" Taking
back the custody sword and reconceiving preference interviews as less-
directed invitations to free narrative will leave judges once again without
guidance in the tremendously difficult task of best-interests decision-
making. Freeing children from the whom-do-you-love-most inquiry may
therefore require correction of the inadequacies of the best-interests
standard.
Professor Elster suggests flipping a coin as an improvement over the
best-interests model in the ordinary case of two fit parents.249 Simple,
equalitarian, and cheap, coin-flipping might indeed improve on the best-
interests model. As Professor Elster concedes, however, basing custody
on the flip of a coin imposes disproportionate costs on the more risk-averse
parent, who is likely to be the parent more attached to the child.25°
Fortunately, there is a better way.
In its recently promulgated Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution, the ALl refines the best-interests model by proposing that
custodial responsibility25' be allocated in proportion to past caretaking.21 2
utterly without any necessary relation to what is best for the child in question"); Elster,
supra note 2, at 14 (noting the best-interests standard invites trial courts "to add some
preferences of her own").
248. See BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 22, at 42-46 (identifying the "children's-
choice presumption" as a means of filling the void left by the best-interests standard).
249. Elster, supra note 2, at 40-42.
250. Id. at 42.
251. In the ALl model, "[c]ustodial responsibility refers to physical custodianship
and supervision of a child." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.03(3). The term denotes
"what traditionally has been called child custody." Id. § 2.08 cmt. a.
252. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(1) ("Unless otherwise resolved by
agreement of the parents ... the court should allocate custodial responsibility so that the
proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion
of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents'
separation."). If no determinative caretaking pattern exists, then the ALl would revert to
the best-interests standard. Id. § 2.08(3).
The ALL credits Elizabeth Scott with the approximation concept. Id. at 8 n. 15 (citing
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preferences and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV.
615 (1992)). This approach has much in common with the primary caretaker preference
favored by some courts and commentators. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 3. See generally
ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 661-65. The rationale underlying a preference for the
parent who has most extensively cared for the child is described in Garska. 278 S.E.2d
357. Garska suggests the primary caretaker may be identified by asking which parent
performs the following duties:
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3)
purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing
and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers after
school, i.e. transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout
meeting; (6) arranging alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7)
putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night,
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The underlying rationale for this approximation model is that the extent of
past caretaking "correlates well with other factors associated with the
child's best interests." '253 Allocating custodial responsibility according to
past caretaking thus ordinarily furthers the child's best interests, even as its
focus on the past "yields more predictable and more easily adjudicated
results."254 The ALI's model offers a compelling alternative to the
inadequacies of the best-interests standard.255
Unfortunately, even as they acknowledge that "[g]iving great weight
to the preferences of a child . . . can raise significant difficulties,"256 the
ALI incorporates into its model an over-reliance on the child's preference
that reflects current practice. This deference to preference takes two
forms. First, in cases in which the approximation model fails, 257 the ALI
reverts to a best-interests standard in which the child's preference is
weighed according to the child's age, maturity, and reasonableness.2 58
This default position perpetuates the costly mistakes of current preference
practices.
Secondly, the ALI abandons its approximation standard altogether in
order "to accommodate the firm and reasonable preferences of a child who
has reached a specific age. 259 This age of maturity is left to state decision-
making, but the ALI suggests in a comment that age "11, 12, 13 or even
14" might be appropriate.160 This preference exception poses significant
waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and
toilet training; (9) educating, i.e., religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10)
teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.
Id. at 363.
The ALI draws an important distinction between "caretaking" and "parenting."
While the former involves "interaction with the child," the latter involves a broader
spectrum of activities, including "economic support," "maintaining or improving the family
residence," "food and clothing purchases," and "other functions that are customarily
performed by a parent or guardian and that are important to the child's welfare and
development." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.03(5)-(6).
253. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt b.
254. Id.
255. The ALl approximation model is more fully discussed in Margaret F. Brinig,
Feminism and Child Custody Under Chapter Two of the American Law Institute's Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 301 (2001), and Kathy T.
Graham, How the ALl Child Custody Principles Help Eliminate Gender and Sexual
Orientation Bias from Child Custody Determinations, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 323
(2001).
256. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f.
257. The approximation model may fail in cases of newborns and in cases in which
parents share caretaking equally. See id.
258. Id. § 2.08(3) & cmt. f.
259. Id. § 2.08(l)(b).
260. Id. § 2.08 cmt. f. Under the ALI model, the preferences of younger children
would not be considered in any case in which the approximation standard applies. See id.
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peril to children. Moreover, it is unnecessary under the ALI's own
scheme.
Consider, for example, the case of the sixteen-year-old child whose
mother has been her primary caretaker, but who openly and adamantly
refuses to live with her mother, preferring her father, with whom she
shares a greater emotional bond and perhaps more mutual interests. A
custody order directing such a child to live with her mother would be
unworkable, even harmful to the child, whose maturity enables her to pack
up and leave her mother's residence on a daily basis, should she choose to
do so.26' Assuming the fitness of both parents and the reasonableness of
the child's preference,262 this case is clearly one in which preference ought
to determine custody. But the ALI model already provides an escape from
the approximation standard in such a case, without the need for a
preference exception.
Among the ALI's qualifications on the approximation standard is a
provision that past caretaking not be determinative when the effect "would
harm the child because of a gross disparity in the quality of the emotional
attachment between each parent and the child."26 Another safety valve
provides for departure from the approximation standard when necessary
"to avoid substantial and almost certain harm to the child."
264
The sixteen-year-old who refuses to live with her primary caretaker
mother falls within one or both of these exceptions, as this child feels a
grossly disparate emotional attachment to her father and the adamancy of
her preference, together with her age, suggests she would experience
substantial and almost certain harm if she were ordered to live with her
mother. For less mature children whose preferences are less adamant,
there is no compelling reason to abandon the determinacy of the
approximation standard and many compelling reasons to refuse to do so,
given the significant costs preference-based decision-making imposes on
children generally.265 Past caretaking should thus determine custody except
in extraordinary cases involving children near majority whose preferences
are so fiercely held as to make arrangements inconsistent with that
preference unworkable and therefore harmful.
If the ALI model were modified to depart from the approximation
standard only in these unusual cases, the need to search out the child's
preference would be virtually eliminated, since mature children with
261. The ALI acknowledges that "it is often unrealistic to expect a court-ordered
arrangement to work well when an older child is firmly opposed to it." Id.
262. For a discussion of some of the circumstances that make preferences and their
underlying affective bonds unreasonable, see supra Part I.B.3.
263. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(1)(01
264. Id. § 2.08(1)(h).
265. See supra Part I.B.3.
2003:115
HeinOnline -- 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 167 2003
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
strongly-held preferences will ordinarily reveal them without being
asked.266 Actually cases involving mature children with strongly-held
preferences are not likely to be litigated in the first place.267 In-camera
interviews could thus be recast as opportunities for free narrative rather
than as narrow invitations to express private preferences. So cast, in-
camera conversations could serve to alert judges to information other than
preference that makes the approximation standard inappropriate while
empowering children to speak broadly rather than to the narrow issue of
custodial choice.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Solomon understood, custody disputes ordinarily allow no easy
answers. The difficulty of custody decision-making, however, is no excuse
for abdicating the custody decision to children, who ordinarily are stressed
by their entanglement in parental hostilities and often significantly
burdened by responsibility, guilt, and regret over their role in the custody
outcome. Children thus should not be asked to express a preference they
have not volunteered, and their volunteered preference should not be made
dispositive except in extraordinary cases.
These changes in current preference-based decision-making are
critical in view of parental demands for access to children's in-camera
conversations. The Eldridge due-process test suggests that parental claims
are constitutionally legitimate in view of the fundamental nature of the
parental right to custody and the substantial risk that a judge will base
custody on a child's inaccurate statements and unreasonable preferences.
Parental access to children's statements, however, increases the risk of
these interviews for children, who may become targeted by parents who
are hurt, angry, or threatened by their children's statements to the judge.
Avoiding in-camera preference questions and reducing the stakes of the
interview by according preference a lesser role, will reduce these risks.
But more is required. To the extent over-reliance on the child's
preference is a response to the inadequacies of the best-interests custody
model, that model must be repaired. The ALl offers a compelling new
custody standard in its approximation model, which generally bases
custody on past caretaking. The ALI's deference to the child's preference,
however, should be rejected in favor of a rule that makes preference
266. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. f ("[C]hildren with firm
preferences will find a way to make those preferences known without significant effort by
those involved in the case.").
267. See BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 22, at 42 (noting that custody trials
normally do not occur in cases "where the child has a pronounced preference and is near
majority").
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dispositive only in extraordinary cases in which a contrary custody
arrangement would clearly be unworkable. While these changes would not
transform custody disputes into easy cases, they would go far in injecting
determinacy into custody decision-making and curtailing the dubious
practice of placing the custody sword in the hands of babes.
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